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PREFACE 
The third edition of Dispute Resolution in Australia: Cases, Commentary and Materials records a further 
reshaping of the dispute resolution landscape across Australia. For example, we are now more fully 
seeing the impact of government changes to the handling of civil disputation with the establishment 
and consolidation of specialist tribunals and commissions. The result of the creation of these 
extra-judicial bodies is a reduction in some jurisdictions of matters proceeding to trial. The interesting 
side-effect of this development is the rise of dispute resolution processes within these specialist 
tribunals and commissions that seek resolution of disputes in order to avoid hearings. 
Further, government and non-government organisations are more attuned to detecting conflict and 
dealing with it an early stage before it escalates into a full-blown dispute and as a result of this we have 
seen the further development of organisational conflict management processes. 
The third edition contains some new features including a chapter on conflict coaching which is an area 
of dispute or conflict resolution that has continued to grow in popularity in response to the 
organisational shift described above. It also provides further career opportunities for those trained in 
both coaching and dispute resolution. 
Another new feature is the re-written chapter on arbitration given Jhe April 2009 agreement of the 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General to draft a new uniform Commercial Arbitration Act for 
domestic arbitration in Australia. The new Acts, passed by all the States in Australia between 
2010-2013, seek to apply the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (including the 2006 amendments) thereby 
aligning some features of international arbitration to the domestic application of arbitration. 
There is a new chapter on dispute resolution and the criminal law system acknowledging the 
development of restorative justice programs which have now been established in a num ber of 
Australian jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions are experiencing successful outcomes through victim­
offender conferencing that often provide the opportunity for the victim of crime to face the offender 
and seek some closure by better understanding the offence and its effects. 
Anoth�J new chapter deals with workplace dispute resolution reflecting the fact that various 
governments have resourced their industrial relations commissions to attempt a consensual resolution 
before allowing parties to embark on a fu l l  hearing of the dispute. 
Sam would like to thank Alex Azarov for his research assistance, and her colleagues Judith Herrmann 
and Claire Holland at the Conflict Management and Resolution Program at JCU for proof reading early 
drafts of various chapters. Both David and Sam would like to thank Natasha Naude and Lucas 
Frederick, Product Developers, as well as Lara Weeks, our editor, from Thomson Reuters. 
As is always the case with books that enjoy co-authorship, two authors often employ slightly different 
writing styles and no matter how talented the publisher's editor is, the two styles are sometimes 
apparent. It is healthy to have such differing styles in the one book and we set our readers the 
challenge of discerning which author wrote which chapter or part of a chapter. To the best of our 
knowledge the law is correct at the time of writing. 
Melboume­
Townsville 
March 2014 
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OVERVIEW 
[1 .05] Dispute resolution has grown in popularity, acceptance and formalisation over the last 
35 years to become a major part of the strategy employed in civil disputes and an important 
managerial tool of business in Australia. The formalisation of dispute resolution has largely 
occurred through the introduction of legislation empowering courts to refer proceedings to a 
variety of dispute resolution processes, most commonly mediation. Further, the business 
community has seen the benefits of resolving disputes through non-adversarial methods and 
have instigated internal and external processes to resolve disputes at an early stage before they 
escalate to the point where curial resolution is sometimes the only way to resolve them. All of 
this has had the effect of increasing the number of organisations which train people in the 
[1 .05] 1 
Dispute Resolution in Australia: Cases, Commentary and Materials 
process and skills development of dispute resolution processes. Today in Australia, and across 
the world, dispute resolution is a significant tool in the administration of justice and the 
conduct of business. 
Further evidence of the growth and formalisation of dispute resolution is the fact that 
nearly every law and business school throughout Australasia, Europe and the Americas teaches 
dispute resolution as either a compulsory or elective undergraduate subject despite the fact 
that Western law schools still teach adversarial appellant law in order to educate students to 
the doctrinal foundation of law. There are many postgraduate courses that offer a suite of 
dispute resolution subjects, which constitute specialist postgraduate qualifications in the 
subject such as the commonly available Master of Dispute Resolution and the newly emerging 
Doctor of Dispute Resolution. Thus, dispute resolution is firmly entrenched in the academic, 
legal, professional and business cultures of Australia and all signs indicate that its growth will 
continue. 
ORIGINS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
[1 .1 O] It is difficult, if not impossible, to track the ongms of dispute resolution because 
negotiations between human beings are as old as the ability to communicate itself. For 
example, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people have been involved in their own form of 
dispute resolution via customary law for almost the entirety of their existence, put 
conservatively at somewhere between 40,000 and 1 00,000 years. 
Aboriginal Dispute Resolution 
[1 .15] L Behrendt, Aboriginal Dispute Resolution (Federation Press, Sydney, 1 995) p 1. 
As in any complex society, traditional Aboriginal groups had their own legal system and methods of 
resolving disputes. People lived in small communities with large extended families. There were strong 
kin ties and notions of community and reciprocity. Such a close-knit environment necessarily required 
the existence of a complex workable system of resolving conflict and a method of communal decision 
making. Those processes needed to be able to produce effectively outcomes that members of the 
community would comply with. 
The abil ity of the group to function harmoniously in its day-to-day existence was necessary for its 
survival. The closeness and interdependence of a community meant that it was imperative for disputes 
to be resolved qu ickly and without animosity. The resolution process had to provide a mechanism that 
would ensure parties would comply with the decision of the group thus ensuring that the social, 
political and economic status quo of the community would be maintained. 
--- ?-.:C)C1.1;1 ---
[1 .20] The history of dispute resolution amongst Aboriginalal and Torres Strait Islander 
people is not a matter of formal record, rather it is a fact that has been passed down from 
generation to generation as part of customary law and story-telling (as discovered by one of 
the authors after his experiences in designing and implementing a mediation program for a 
peak Aboriginal body in 1 995) .  
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Mediating in Aboriginal Communities 
[1 .25] D Spencer, "Mediating in Aborig inal Communities" (1 996-97) 3 Commercial Dispute Resolution 
journal 245 at 245. 
Australian Aborigines have practised consensual problem solving, in one form or another, over the 
period of existence, popularly considered to be some 40 thousand years. During that period, they 
have developed a notion of community ownership of disputes and a determined approach to solving 
them. Because of this they have been described as superb negotiators and can be counted as one of 
the many pioneers of consensual dispute resolution. 
--- �(� ---
[1 .30] Having acknowledged the history of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander dispute 
resolution, albeit briefly, it is also possible to track the formalisation of Western dispute 
resolution in Australia. One starting point is the Commonwealth Constitution, which was 
passed by the Imperial Parliament of England in 1900 and came into force in Australia on 
1 January 1901 when the Commonwealth of Australia was officially born. Section 5 1  provides 
that: 
"The Parliament shall, subj ect to this Constitution, have power to make laws for peace, order, 
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:- (xxxv.) Conciliation and 
arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes beyond the limits of any one 
State ."  
The drafters of the Constitution clearly thought that the power to conciliate and arbitrate 
industrial disputes was an important safeguard for an emerging nation. An example of how 
important this safeguard was is arguably the fact that the conservative government of Stanley 
Bruce and Earle Page was brought down in the federal election of 1 929 on the basis of an 
attack on the system of arbitration of industrial disputes. The Labor Party, who won office 
that year, successfully campaigned in that election that attacking the arbitration system was an 
attack on the standard of living of every Australian, thereby threatening the wellbeing of all 
working Australians. 
Constitutional change 
[1 .35] The power granted under s 5 1 (xxxv) and under Ch III of the Commonwealth 
Constitution led to the passing of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1 904, 
which established the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to hear 
applications for the making of awards and the resolution of disputes between employers and 
employees. The court was split into two separate bodies - the Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission and the Commonwealth Industrial Court (now the Industrial 
Relations Court) - when it was found that it was unconstitutional for a court to exercise 
non-judicial power. 
Public and private sector growth 
[1 .40] Dispute resolution in Australia functions in two distinct spheres. The initial sphere of 
influence was in the private sector with dispute resolution agencies, such as the Australian 
Commercial Disputes Centre, Lawyers Engaged in Alternative Dispute Resolution (LEADR -
now known as Leading Edge Alternative Dispute Resolution), Mediate Today and The Accord 
Group offering dispute resolution services predominantly to the private sector. While these 
agencies are still operating successfully in Australia, the real growth in dispute resolution 
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services has taken place in the public sphere with these and other agencies providing dispute 
resolution practitioners to the court and statutory authorities that support dispute resolution 
programs. 
Public dispute resolution has flourished under increasing legislation which provides 
non-adjudicative dispute resolution as a first step before litigation. Legislation has more than 
doubled in the last decade in Australia with nearly all courts, tribunals and commissions 
having mandatory or voluntary dispute resolution programs in place prior to parties 
proceeding to trial or hearing. 
This topic will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 14. For the moment, the rise of 
dispute resolution in Australia is the history of the public and private sectors complementing 
each other to create a firm base of non-adjudicative dispute resolution dovetailing with 
adjudicative forms of dispute resolution to provide an array of methods to resolve conflict 
between people in dispute. 
Conflict Management: A Practical Guide 
[1 .45] P Condliffe, Conflict Management: A Practical Guide (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 
201 2) pp 1 1 4-1 1 7. 
Introduction 
Since Europeans arrived Austral ian history has been enthused with notions of individualism and 
battling the harsh climate and landscape of the frontier. We revel in the imagery of competitive sports 
and of a nation bonded through war. Yet we also have a strong and rich tradition of communal sharing 
and fellowship that has lent itself to the adoption of these new processes, not only during the last three 
decades but earlier as well. Our indigenous people also have a rich history that encompasses a range of 
processes we now identify as ADR innovations. As Astor and Chinkin (1 992) point out , I ndigenous 
communities in Australia have used a range of methods to deal with conflict (for example shaming, 
exclusion, compensation, initiation and training based upon a system of kinship-based law) for 
thousands of years. 
The ADR movement draws heavily upon our history of collective dispute management, especially in  
the industrial relations system. A study of Australian history since European settlement reveals that 
non-litigious forms of dispute management have been practised i n  Australia since colonial times 
through arbitration provisions inherited from English law and the establishment of informal tribunal 
and ombudsmen systems. As well, the federal government, at a very early stage, developed a 
conciliation and arbitration system to manage the labour market although this progressively 
developed into a rather formal litigious system. These early developments were rather piecemeal and it 
was not until the late 1 960s and 1 970s that significant interest began to focus on informal dispute 
resolution, although the early focus was upon tribunal systems and arbitration. In the late 1 970s 
interest in  mediation-based approaches began. Most arbitration, ombudsman and tribunal systems 
provide alternatives to traditional litigation but do not necessarily provide for the self-determination of 
the disputant parties, which is central to mediation programs. It was this emphasis which tied 
mediation into the rise of communitarian and consumer rights ideals and projects of the time and 
which marks the beginning of the modern ADR movement. 
The Modern ADR Movement 
The beginning of the government-funded Community Justice Centres Pilot in 1 980 (NSW) provided 
the in itial impetus for the development of what we now recognise as a new movement that became 
"ADR". This pilot was followed by similar establ ishments in Victoria (1 987) and Queensland (1 990). 
The centres were modelled o n  community-based mediation services, which had sprung up in great 
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profusion in the United States. These services, institutionalised withi n  government bureaucracies, 
aimed at providing services to a long neglected and il l-used sector of conflict - community disputes. 
They also pioneered the use of mediation in public issue disputes, victim-offender mediation 
(sometimes called "conferencing") and family mediation. 
The legal profession quickly followed these developments and established a specially constituted 
forum, Lawyers Engaged in ADR (LEADR - now known as Leading Edge Alternative Dispute 
Resolution), to develop and lobby for the use of mediation within the legal system. Many universities 
and law schools now offer ADR or mediation courses. Other professions have been slower to embrace 
these new approaches but this is rapidly changing, especially in the environmental planning and 
human service fields. [1 1 5] 
Key Developments in Australia ADR 
Key developments in Australian ADR 
1 892 Courts of Conciliation Act 1 892 (Qld) is proclaimed. 
1 904 Arbitration and Conciliation Court (Cth) provides for informal conferences. 
1 929 Conciliation Act 1 929 (SA) provides for pre-trial interviews. 
1 93 1  Courts of Conciliation Act 7 892(Qld) amended to streamline procedures. 
1 974 Consumer Claims Tribunal adopted neutral third party referees. 
1 975 Family Law Act 1 975 (Cth) provides for counselling and conferences. 
1 975 Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia (IAMA) established. 
1 977 Anti-Discrimination Act 7 977 (NSW) provides for concil iation. 
1 979 Land and Environment Court (NSW) provides for conferences. 
1 98 0  Community justice Centres (Pilot Project) Act 1 980 is proclaimed. 
1 983 Community justice Centres Act 7 983 (NSW) provides for community-based services. 
1 983 Victorian County Court Build ing Cases List makes provision for referral to mediation. 
1 984 Norwood (SA) Community Mediation Service established. 
1 985 Noble Park (Vic) Family Mediation Centre established. 
1 985 Australian Commercial Dispute Centre (ACDC) established. 
1 987 Neighbourhood Mediation Centres established by Legal Aid Department (Vic). 
1 987 Formation of the Australian Dispute Resolution Association (ADRA), the first State-based 
ADR association, based in Sydney. 
1 987 Federal Court pilot ADR program begins in the NSW District Registry. 
1 988 ACT Conflict Resolution Service established. 
1 989 Establishment of Lawyers Engaged in ADR (LEADR), now known as Leading Edge ADR - a 
non-for-profit lobby, professional and service organisation. 
1 990 Dispute Resolution Centres Act 1 990 is proclaimed (Qld) establishing Community justice 
Program now known as Dispute Resolution Centres. 
1 99 1  Courts (Mediation and Arbitration) Act 1 99 1  introduces voluntary (since 1 99 7 mandatory) 
med iation to the Federal Court. 
1 997  Canberra Mediation Service established. 
1 992 "Spring Offensive" is initiated by Supreme Court of Victoria with review of waiting cases, 
many of which were referred to mediation. Equivalent "Settlement Week" occurs i n  NSW. 
1 993 Administrative Appeals Tribunal introduced mediation conferences. 
1 994 Farm Debt Mediation Act 1 994 (NSW) is proclaimed. 
1 995 Establishment of the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) by 
the Commonwealth Attorney-General to monitor and promote the use of ADR. 
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1 995 Family Law Reform Act 1 995 establishes central ity of "Primary Dispute Resolution". 
1 996 Native Title Act 1 99 3 amendments gave increased emphasis to mediation before the Native 
Title Tribunal. [1 1 6] 
1 996 Workplace Relations Act 1 996 is [sic] referred to mediation for the first time in industrial 
disputes. 
2000 NADRAC discussion paper, The Development of Standards for ADR. 
2004 NADRAC discussion paper, Who Says You're a Mediator? Towards a National System for 
Accrediting Mediators, outlines the need for mediation accreditation and standards. 
2005 National Mediation Conference appoints sub-committee to consider accreditation and 
standards for mediators. 
2006 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) is implemented, 
mandating mediation in cases seeking parenting orders. 
2007 Introduction of new accreditation scheme for family mediators under the Family Law 
Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth). 
2008 Implementation (1 January 2008) of National Mediation Accreditation Standards through a 
committee convened by NADRAC. 
2 0 1 0  Civil Dispute Resolution Ac;t 20 1 0  (Cth). Lead ing example of a statutory attempt to improve 
timeliness and party responsibil ity to settle disputes before litigation commences. 
Courts, banking, insurance, and other large institutionalised systems have now embraced mediation, 
in varying degrees, as part of their conflict management strategies. One significant ind icator of this 
growth has been the proliferation of ADR related legislation that has emerged to deal with the 
increasing array of services. Since 1 990, when there were a mere handful of Australian statutes 
referring to mediation, there are now well over 1 00 statutes national ly. This figure does not include 
legislation that includes references to other processes like conciliation, arbitration and case appraisal. 
Like many broad based social movements ADR has not had many "Napoleons" to lead the way 
forward, but it has had many "champions" who through their dogged persistence and patience have 
achieved remarkable things. Their efforts have been mostly unheralded or known only in  their own 
State or locality. Often the advances have necessarily been incremental and therefore without the 
drama of "the big announcement" so beloved of our political figures. However, even a cursory review 
of the following list, which includes only the salient points, provides an insight into the remarkable 
range and depth of the services now provided. 
One of the largest, fastest growing and innovative areas of ADR practice is in family law. While the 
Family Law Act 7 975 has always emphasised the management of disputes by ADR processes, the Family 
Law Reform Act 7 995 reaffirmed the centrality of these alternative processes by designating them 
"Primary Dispute Resolution".  The related Family Law Regulations contain very comprehensive 
statutory mediation protocols dealing with such issues as accreditation, standards, duties and 
obligations. The funding of outsourced community-based services by the Commonwealth grounded 
on these regulations (mainly to Relationships Australia and Centacare) has provided [1 1 7] the impetus 
for the development of new and innovative processes, supervision and research. 
Significant reforms to the family law system were introduced in 2006. These require parties before 
the Family Court to attend a family dispute resolution service if they want a parenting order. Once they 
attend this service the parties can obtain a certificate that they have attempted dispute resolution and 
then may apply to the Court for an order. As well, a less adversarial hearing model in children's matters 
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was introduced. Section l 3C of the Family Law Act 1 975 empowers the Family Court, at any stage of 
the proceedings, to order that parties attend a conciliation, family counselling or family dispute 
resolution procedure. 
--- lJ:J)C� ---
THE "A" IN ADR 
[1 .50] Arguably the first person to coin the phrase "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (ADR) 
was American lawyer and academic Professor Eric Green, who was involved in a large 
commercial case regarding the alleged infringement of certain patents relating to computerised 
charge authorisation and credit-verification devices. The parties were on the trial trail with 
proceedings on foot and pre-trial discovery well underway. The parties agreed to run a 
mini-trial or senior management review process whereby the parties would attend a two-day 
"information exchange" chaired by a neutral third party - a former civil judge. The 
information exchange was just that, a chance to exchange information via the parties 
themselves presenting their sides of the dispute to senior management. The senior management 
were charged with the responsibility of resolving the dispute arid the third party's role was to 
moderate proceedings and effect a compromise. Green authored an article after his experience 
in that case and referred to the process as "an alternative approach" - ADR was born in the 
formal sense. 
Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Approach 
[1 .55] E Green, J Marks and R Olson, "Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Approach" (1 978) 
1 1  Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 493 at 493-51 1 . 
Introduction 
Over 50 years ago, Judge Learned Hand told the Bar of New York, /1 As a l itig'!nt, I should dread a 
lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death ." Judge Hand's remark is even more 
true today. The burgeoning costs and demoralizing delays of dispute resolution through formal, legal 
means are central to the crisis which so many now perceive in the American system of civil justice. 
For the individual litigant efforts are being made to confront and resolve the crisis. By far the largest 
single cost of litigation is attorney's fees. In  this area, the OEO Legal Services Program and the Legal 
Services Corporation have made significant strides towards providing free counsel to the poorest 
Americans. Group and prepaid legal service programs have been started to provide legal services to 
middle income Americans at affordable prices. In addition, there is growing recog nition that less 
formal mechanisms of dispute resolution may provide the best answer to the problems of expense and 
delay which beset individual civil litigants in our courts. For example, mandatory arbitration of smaller 
[494] civil suits in the federal courts seems inevitable; in Los Angeles, a pilot Neighborhood Justice 
Center has been set up to resolve minor disputes entirely outside the courts. Interesting ly, however, 
while these and other innovations promise more efficient dispute resolution procedures for individual 
litigants, very little attention has been devoted to developing alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms for the large corporate litigation that consumes hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal 
costs and hundreds of days in court and lawyer time. 
Arbitration stands as almost the only well developed alternative to full-scale litigation for entities which 
find themselves embroiled in disputes [495] which cannot be solved throug h normal business 
negotiations. Yet, binding arbitration is often not acceptable to the parties. Convinced of the justness 
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of its cause, a plaintiff may be wil l ing to risk the compromise that reputedly so often characterizes 
arbitration awards; unsure of the nature and extent of its liability, a defendant may be unwilling to give 
up the protection of full pretrial discovery, strict evidentiary rules and well-defined substantive 
standards, especially when the damages claimed are in six, seven or more figures. For these and other 
reasons, many litigants and corporate attorneys approach arbitration "like a lonesome cat in a strange 
alley." 
Moreover, in spite of binding arbitration's often being seen as simply too dangerous, surprisingly little 
thought has been given to the possibility that efforts at settlement might consist of something more 
than traditional non-binding negotiations between lawyers or corporate executives in which dollar 
bargaining is the primary focus. Indeed, the l iterature of l itigation settlement is made up of little other 
than "how-to-do-it" manuals focusing, for example, on the resolution of personal injury cases. 
[496] Yet merely because the legal difficulties of lower and middle income Americans may constitute 
more important social problems on most people's scale of values, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that the crisis in American civil justice extends beyond those groups into large case litigation. The 
problems of large case litigation are ones which affect the quality of civil justice as a whole. The pretrial 
paper wars and extended trials of many such cases play a significant role in clogging the dockets of our 
courts, both state and federal. Further, the extraordinary costs of litigating such cases affect not merely 
the corporations themselves, but, of necessity, their employees and shareholders, and the consumer. 
There are several possible reasons why there has been a dearth of innovative ideas aimed at devising 
alternate dispute resolution mechanisms for large case litigation. Perhaps the corporate litigation bar 
should be blamed for a lack of imagination, for an unwill ingness to take risks, and for a failure to apply 
careful cost-benefit analysis to their activities on behalf of their clients. Perhaps corporate managements 
should be blamed for too often allowing themselves to be insulated from the litigation process, either 
because they seek to avoid ultimate responsibility or because they mistakenly bel ieve that the 
complexities of the process are for lawyers only. Perhaps the true culprit is the relative insularity of 
most American legal education: 
Another barrier to the active participation of lawyers in the creation of new "justice­
producing" institutions lies in the structure and content of legal education. Law schools rarely 
teach the essential skil ls of negotiation and mediation; rather, their concentration on the 
dissection of appellate court cases emphasizes the escalation of disputes rather than their 
prevention or early settlement . . .  The dearth of interdisciplinary study makes it difficult for 
lawyers to perceive alternative ways of dealing with different types of existing disputes and 
those l ikely to arise from emerging technologies. 
[497] Whatever the reason, the fai lure of the corporate litigation bar to develop alternate dispute 
resolution mechanisms is particularly puzzl ing given another usual characteristic of their corporate 
clients. Most companies have a firm pol icy of attempting to avoid litigation by investigating and 
resolving disputes on a businesslike basis as promptly as possible. They generally "prefer the 
procedural uncertainties of private settlement techniques to the substantive uncertainties of the 
courts." It is common, for example, for corporate management faced with a ripening conflict with 
another company to schedule a meeting at which responsible employees from each company appear 
and present both sides of the dispute. In such circumstances the business principals of the companies 
sit as fact-finders and as judges. They may or may not consult counsel. 
By contrast, once litigation is initiated such simple and informal attempts at dispute resolution rarely 
occur. Settlement discussions involving corporate management thereafter generally subordinate 
debate on substantive issues to a more direct consideration of what it wil l  take to settle the case . . .  
Demon Litigation 
Corporate executives and in-house counsel know that it can be disastrous for a company simply to be 
sued, let alone suffer an adverse judgment. There is no escaping one infallible premise - resolving the 
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dispute wi ll be very costly. Payment will be either to the plaintiff, to defense counsel, or - worst of all -
to both. House counsel and management also know that successfully defending a large lawsuit is 
frequently more costly than simply paying a large settlement to the plaintiff. Indeed, defendants are 
often convinced that this is the only basis for the suit in the first place. 
[498] The cost of large corporate litigation also has a great impact on plaintiffs. Since the defendant is 
typically in possession of the money or property that is the subject matter of the dispute and has the 
use of it during the pendency of the suit, the defendant wi ll often have both reason and the resources 
to drag out the litigation. A corporation with an unassailable claim and sufficient resources to 
prosecute fully a court case may find that discovery hurdles placed by the defendant between the 
summons at the starting line and the judgment at the finish have made the prize not worth the 
pursuit. 
The cost of prosecuting or defending a large corporate lawsuit involving unresolved legal contentions, 
complex factual issues, many witnesses, and the usual roomfuls of documents may be divided into two 
basic categories - (1 ) pretrial discovery and motion costs and (2) trial costs. Discovery and motion 
costs usually accrue at a slower rate than trial costs, but build up over a longer period of time - often 
for two, three, or as many as five years. 
Reliable figures are hard to come by, especially for pretrial costs of litigation, but one authority 
estimated in 1 975 that the cost to the client of counsel's merely reading and taking notes on the 
documents produced in a moderately-sized civil litigation - defined as a case involving 1 0,000 
documents of an average of ten pages per document and generating 5000 pages of transcript - is 
$300,000. This figure did not include the more time-consuming process of searching the documents 
for combinations of facts and ana lyzing the assembled data. Allowing for inflation, which affects the 
legal profession as much as it does industry, these figures would be even higher today. 
Indeed, there is a growing feel ing among business-oriented attorneys and critical commentators that 
modern discovery practice, introduced as a great reform, is now more of a problem than a solution. 
One critic states: 
Coupled with requests for class action treatment, discovery has been perverted into a vehicle 
for extracting substantial settlements, with [499] some defendants reluctantly consenting to 
this extortion in order to avoid years of involvement, enormous expenses and attorneys' fees, 
and the inordinate drain upon corporate time and energy that is inevitably involved in the 
defense. 
But discovery and other pretrial costs are not the only factors that make suing or being, sued, even 
unjustly, a major economic event for a corporation today. Should the parties not reach a settlement 
after exhausting themselves in the discovery and pretrial motion phase of the litigation, costs escalate 
significantly in the immediate pretrial preparation phase, as counsel "staff-up" with experts, associates 
and paralegals. Costs increase again for the trial itself. In one extreme but not unique case, the SCM 
antitrust suit against Xerox, the legal costs during trial to SCM and Xerox combined have been 
conservatively estimated to be $50,000 a day, five days a week, or over $ 1 ,  000, 000 a month. Trial is 
expected to last five to eight months. The pretrial costs were l ikely even higher. The two sides took 
pretrial depositions from a total of 233 potential witnesses. Of course, the stakes are high - SCM seeks 
$1 .8 billion in damages. 
Moreover, the tangible costs that show up directly on the income statement under "legal costs" are 
only a part of the actual costs of large corporate litigation. Management time and energy and 
technical resources diverted from normal activities to the litigation process are additional overhead 
items, with no productive possibilities, that increase the cost of goods produced or services rendered. 
Thus, prospect of an indirect as well as a di rect drain on the corporate resources during two to five 
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years of litigation is often a strong incentive for top management to seek some means of informally 
resolving litigation and getting employees back to productive work, even if it means paying money 
management feels is not owed. 
There is a third party whose interests also must be recognized - the judicial system. Although 
comprising only a small percentage of cases, [500] large corporate litigation increasingly consumes a 
disproportionately large amount of judicial and lawyer resources, contributing to an already severe 
congestion problem. This problem is assuming crisis proportions in some places as delays run into four 
or five years and court systems approach the breakdown point. 
In the federal system, the district court civil case load continues to show an upward trend, as it has for 
the last fifteen years. In 1 976, 1 30,597 civil cases were ?led in the district courts, compared to 1 1 7,320 
in 1 975 and 59,284 in 1 960. This is an increase of 1 1 .3% over 1 975 and 1 20.3% over 1 960. An even 
more disturbing statistic is that of the 1 36, 753 cases pending in the district courts at the close of 1 976 
(exclusive of land condemnation cases), 9,41 4 had been pending for more than three years. 
Moreover, the trend is to greater delay. The percentage of cases pending for more than one, two, and 
three years in 1 976 increased over 1 975 by 25.5%, 23.5% and 24.5%, respectively. 
The statistics for the federal courts of appeals are similarly alarming. The number of new cases 
docketed in 1 976, showed a 1 0.5% increase over 1 975, and a 281 . 7% increase over 1 962. Altogether, 
1 8,408 cases were ?led for appeal in 1 976, compared to 4,823 in 1 962. 
[501 ] Given such statistics, it is obvious that either radical reform of the dispute resolution process or a 
commitment of vastly more resources to the judicial system, or both, are necessary just to keep 
matters from getting worse than they already are. But private lawyers representing corporate clients 
increasingly disgruntled with large legal fees cannot wait for long term reform. The corporate litigator 
must explore every available dispute resolution mechanism that might be advantageous to the client 
. . .  [507] 
Some General Observations 
For the parties involved, the success of the Information Exchange was testimony enough to its value. 
For others who may be interested in similar experimentation, however, several additional aspects of 
the procedure might be pointed out. J:very case is different, and what worked in the case discussed 
might not work at all in another situation. In considering whether to try a procedure l ike the one 
described or to create a new model, counsel and clients must consider many variables and make a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine the best way to proceed. In this analysis the following factors may 
be relevant. 
First, very little of the money expended on the Information Exchange would have been wasted had the 
proceeding not resulted in a resolution of the dispute. The Information Exchange forced each side 
rigorously to organize the mass of facts and legal arguments which had been gathered over two and 
one half years of discovery and legal maneuvering, just as they would have had to do to prepare the 
case for pretrial and trial. The "introductory statements" were short versions of what would have been 
trial briefs, the "oral presentations" were outlines of what would have been trial evidence, and the 
exhibits were the same as those that would have had to be collected and organized for trial. Thus, the 
procedure as implemented demanded preparation by counsel and experts which would have been 
di rectly useful at trial had the case not been settled. 
The only Information Exchange expenditures which were not related to activities which would have 
had to have been incurred in any case for trial were those relating to the negotiations which led to the 
I nformation Exchange and those for the time spent at the Information Exchange itself. For one of the 
parties, these amounted to approximately 25% of total Information Exchange expenditures. These 
non-transferable expenditures were the only monies risked by that party's management in carrying 
out the Information Exchange. Total costs to judgment would have been approximately ten times 
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greater. Because management considered that it was th us risking a relatively small amount of money 
in order to avoid an [508] otherwise ce rtain  expenditure of a great deal more, it viewed the required 
financial investment as well worth the risk that the procedure might be a flop. 
Moreover since the pen ding Information Exchange forced counsel to concentrate their efforts within 
several weeks, rather than over many months or years, there was no need for them to spend 
prel imin ary time to reeducate themselves on the case as crises or significant events occurred. The 
matter as a whole had to be mastered and kept in mind during the entire period. Because of this 
necessity for organizing the case in a short time, connecti ons between relevant facts and legal theories, 
which m ight not otherwise have been made until pretrial or trial were made significantly earlier. Had 
the litigation continued, this  would have fostered more focused discovery and pretrial preparation . I n  
sum, had the case not been settled, the i ntensive time spent by counsel in  preparing for the 
Information Exchange would l ikely have been worth significantly more to the client than the same 
amount of less focused time spent during the long pretrial phase of the case. 
Apart from the prospects of earlier settlement and of the client's obtaining a better return per dollar in  
attorney's fees spent, there are other potential advantages for client and attorney al ike from an 
Information Exchange procedure. Significantly, i t  may provide a means for a client to d iscipl ine its 
attorneys. For example, sometimes where there is l ittle or no pressure coming from the court, defense 
attorneys approach a case - even an important one - in a relatively relaxed manner. Thus, they may 
not immediately investigate or organize the factual and legal aspects of the case in a sufficiently 
thorough manner to appreciate fully the true legal situation and proper settlement posture. In other 
circumstances, the lack of pressure sometimes leads attorneys into over-litigation, unnecessarily 
dotting "i's" and crossing "t's" with regard to both discovery and legal research. An attorney's 
judgment about what is essential may be controlled by the amount of time and associate resources 
avai lable. In  either case, the Information Exchange procedure can serve as a useful management tool, 
forcing careful and early an alysis on the one hand and selective judgm ent on the other. 
From the attorney's perspective, the I nformation Exchange procedure may have the equally important 
effect of involving and educating the client. In the end, decisions with regard to settlement and legal 
expenses must be made by the client's responsible executive. Often, however, attorneys feel that these 
ex�cutives do not devote enough attention to litigation and therefore are unable to make 
well-informed judgments. Even where corporate in-house counsel is actively involved in a case, it is 
[509] important for the outside litigator primarily responsible for the case to be able to deal with a 
decision making executive who actually understands the detailed al legations and facts of the case in  
more than a second-hand manner. 
The Information Exchange provides an opportunity for educating an execu tive to make rational 
decisions about the litigation. This can pay off in  more ways than just settl ing the case. Even if the 
Information Exchange does not lead to settlement, it will leave the business principals with a much 
more accurate understanding of the nature of the dispute and with a greater appreciation of counsel's 
later attempts to mobilize corporate employees to assist in pursuing or responding to resumed 
discovery and in prepari ng for trial .  Moreover, the procedure provides the executive with an 
oppo rtunity to actually see, hear and take the measure of the antagon ists in  a situation akin to that 
Which will obtain at trial. Thus, for client and attorney al ike, the I nformation Exchange which does not 
lead to settlement will by its very nature still serve to reduce uncertainty with regard to the other side's 
position. Especially where an I nformation Exch ange provides an opportunity for free questioning of 
the other side with regard to its legal and factual arguments, there is a higher l ikeli hood that one will 
ferret out the other side's "best case" than with traditional discovery tech niques. 
The Information Exchange described above came at a relatively late stage in the proceedings, after 
considerable pre-trial sparring and discovery. Communication had broken down and compromise 
through traditional settlement negotiations did not appear possible. Nevertheless, it seemed 
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reasonable to believe that each party was still capable of acting with a minimum of rational ity -
desiring to resolve the case as favorably as possible, with the least expense and risk, and the least delay. 
What was crucial to the ultimate resolution was that litigators on both sides, conscious that there 
remained some remote possibility of creating an avenue of communication, did not simply throw up 
their hands and begin to gird for trial. just as important, executives on both sides were willing to risk 
an untried procedure. 
Thus, counsel devised a procedure which combined in a new way features of various well-known 
dispute resolution mechanisms. For example, the Information Exchange assured a particular form of 
participation for the parties - the opportunity to present proofs and arguments - which is basic to one 
scholar's definition of the adjud icatory process. However, un like adjudication and arbitration, the 
Information Exchange [51 O] did not establish a win/lose situation. In this respect, it resembled 
mediation, conciliation or negotiation. The parties did set their own rules of procedure and select a 
third party to help resolve the dispute. In  these respects the Information Exchange procedure followed 
an arbitration model; however, unlike an arbitrator, the advisor had no binding decision-making 
capacity. Yet his very presence - and the ultimate prospect of his advisory opinion - provided a strong 
incentive to the parties to be both credible and careful in their presentations. In essence, the advisor 
was akin to a mediator or conciliator, except that his charge was merely to help determine the 
probable victor at trial rather than also to facil itate compromise. 
Had the case been at a different stage or had there been different crucial issues, the structure of the 
Information Exchange would surely have been different. For example, if the Information Exchange had 
come earlier in the litigation, before the bulk of discovery, a longer period of expedited, l imited 
pre-Information Exchange discovery might have been necessary. Nevertheless, since reducing 
discovery costs is a primary incentive for trying such a procedure, it seems advisable to attempt such 
an approach as early in the case as possible. Realistical ly, however, the need for a formalized settlement 
procedure will rarely be appreciated until after traditional, informal negotiations have failed and 
discovery and other pretrial proceedings have brought home the realities of the process and stated the 
initial thirst for l itigative combat. Further, the rather complex procedure described above seems better 
suited to cases involving mixed questions of law and fact - questions dealing with the legal 
consequences of a variety of factual circumstances - than with questions solely, or primari ly, of law or 
credibil ity. Thus, for example, the procedure seems well su ited to resolving an antitrust case where the 
"sticking point" to settlement is the scope and definition of the relevant market, or an unfair 
competition case where the crucial issue is the propriety of certain disputed business practices. By 
contrast, where a case turns solely on legal issues, summary judgment procedures are likely to provide 
a means to resolve it. But where a case primarily turns on factual disputes involving credibility, the kind 
of Information Exchange procedure described above is not likely to be any more effective in resolving 
the case than traditional settlement negotiations or arbitration, However, where the factual disputes 
are technical ones, requiring expert analysis and promising a "battle of the experts" at trial, a modified 
Information Exchange procedure involving a neutral expert might be the best approach. Thus, in a 
circumstance where, for [51 1 ]  example, the performance of a product is at issue, a joint testing 
procedure carried out by each side's experts and a neutral expert might well provide sufficient data to 
foster a settlement through traditional negotiations, without the necessity of also having a full-blown 
Information Exchange. 
Conclusion 
Obviously the concept presented here is not a panacea. By itself it is no cure for the court congestion 
and delay that plague our formal dispute resolution system, or for the ruinous litigation costs that 
increasingly concern corporate executives. Even so, the success of this procedure should demonstrate 
to the corporate litigation bar that successful alternatives to mil l ion dollar litigation can be devised. 
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If such alternatives are to be developed and implemented, the corporate l itigator must be fami l iar with 
the features of different dispute resolution mechanisms so that when faced with a situation in which an 
Information Exchange or some other dispute resolution proceeding seems appropriate, d ifferent 
characteristics can be borrowed from those traditional mechanisms. The end result, l ike a Dr. Seuss 
creation, may not be immediately recognizable as anything remotely familiar. But the only appropriate 
criterion is whether it wi l l work. 
(1 .60] The statistics quoted in Green's article as to the costs of litigation and the workload of 
the various courts in the United States are somewhat dated but are an indication of the crisis 
facing litigants and governments at the time Green wrote his paper. 
Argument has raged within dispute resolution circles about the use of the word 
"alternative" in alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The title of this book does not refer to 
the word "alternative " as its use is a misnomer. The Macquarie Dictionary defines alternative 
to mean: "affording a choice between two things, or a possibility of one thing out of two . . .  (of 
two things) mutually exclusive, so that if one is chosen the other must be rejected".  If a 
plaintiff or defendant wishes to employ, for example, negotiation or mediation as a way to 
resolve a dispute, they do not employ it as an alternative to litigation, thereby forfeiting that 
right. They employ it as a process that is complementary to litigation. In other words, dispute 
resolution is not an alternative to litigation rather, it is one of a number of processes that seeks 
to resolve disputes before a court may have to adjudicate them. 
Certainly philosophically and theoretically dispute resolution is alternative to adjudication, 
however, in terms of processes employed to resolve a dispute, both consensual and curial 
methods are not alternatives, rather they are complementary methods. Judges ordering 
mandatory mediation under the various pieces of legislation in Australia do not order parties 
to mediation to the exclusion of litigation in the sense of them being alternatives. Their 
Honours make such orders in the hope that time consuming and costly litigation may be 
avoided through a consensual resolution of the dispute - they see such processes as being 
complementary to litigation not an alternative to it. 
The Language of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
[1 .65] Sir Laurence Street, "The Language of Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1 992) 66 Australian 
Law journal 1 94. 
The Language of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
An exposition of the language of ADR will, I believe, be of use in dispelling some of the fog that is 
beginning to cloud the whole field of dispute resolution. The fog has been generated by 
well-intentioned, but misguided, attempts to introduce precision of terminology into a field that, by its 
very nature, does not lend itself to precision. 
The British Academy of Experts recently established a working party upon the language of ADR with a 
view to seeing if it i s  possible to make some recommendations in respect of the more commonly used 
expressions. The decision to undertake this exercise derived from the Academy's recog nition that, and 
I quote from its records: 
There appears to be a vast difference of understanding and interpretation in respect of the 
terminology. 
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It cannot be doubted that litigation - the process of formal determination of a dispute by a court -
stands clear and positive amongst dispute resolution procedures. It is indeed well that this process, the 
sovereign remedy of litigation leading to judicial determination, is clearly recognisable and 
understood. The area of inconsistency and confusion is in the classification of other mechanisms that 
make up the whole spectrum of dispute resolution procedures. 
I have on an earlier occasion when invited to address this Institute expressed a deep commitment to 
regarding ADR as standing for "Additional Dispute Resolution". I venture to quote my observations 
from the transcript of the proceed ings in relation to the acronym ADR as short for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution. In  so doing I note that the passage relates to the domestic environment rather than 
international commercial disputation. 
It is not in truth "Alternative" . It  is not in competition with the established judicial system. It is -
an Additional range of mechanisms within the overall aggregated mechanisms for the 
resolution of disputes. Nothing can be alternative to the sovereign authority of the court 
system .  We cannot tolerate any thought of an alternative to the judicial arm of the sovereign 
in the discharge of the responsibility of resolving disputes between state and citizen or 
between citizen and citizen. We can, however, accommodate mechanisms which operate as 
Additional or subsidiary processes in the discharge of the sovereign's responsibility. These 
enable the court system to devote its precious time and resources to the more solemn task,of 
administering justice in the name of the sovereign. 
I recognise that the phrase "Alternative Dispute Resolution" is by now far too deeply entrenched to be 
able to be recommitted. In  making [p 1 95] this point, however, my purpose is not to increase the 
element of terminological uncertainty, but rather to remove preconceptions that have tended to 
develop out of the use of the word "Alternative" . 
--- f:00l ---
[1 .70] The better way to describe such processes as conciliation, negot1at10n, mediation, 
arbitration and litigation is to refer to them simply as "dispute resolution" .  Perhaps if a 
narrower definition is required, then another way to define these processes would be to divide 
them into either curial and non-curial dispute resolution or adjudicative and non-adjudicative 
dispute resolution (see [1 . 1 00]). Nevertheless, all the previously mentioned methods are ways 
of resolving disputes and, given the flexibility of our justice system, none of them are 
alternatives to each other, rather, they complement each other. 
Sir Laurence Street coined the phrase " additional dispute resolution" and other 
commentators have used the phrase "assisted dispute resolution" to better describe the use of 
the "A" in ADR. In this book ADR will be referred to as "dispute resolution" and will mean 
non-curial methods of dispute resolution unless otherwise stated (see [1 .95] ). 
DEFINING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
[1 .75] The task of defining the various forms of dispute resolution that have developed over 
the years is a challenging one. While most processes have distinguishing features capable of 
description and differentiation to other forms of dispute resolution, the emergence of hybrid 
forms of dispute resolution has blurred the descriptive lines between the various processes. 
This development is only problematic from the perspective of ascribing a definition, which is 
of use in cases where contracts or legislation require an accurately defined dispute resolution 
process. Particularly from the contracts perspective, to satisfy the rules of contractual drafting, 
parties to a contract must know with some degree of certainty what process of dispute 
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resolution they are agreeing to participate in should a dispute arise under the contract. 
Otherwise the emergence of hybrid forms of dispute resolution is a healthy development as it is 
evidence that dispute resolution (see [1 .95])  is adapting to serve disputants. Its ability to adapt 
is one of the strengths of dispute resolution and it should be practised and allowed to develop 
in this way. 
Dispute Resolution Guidebook 
(1 .80] R Charlton, Dispute Resolution Guidebook (LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2000) pp 3-1 0. 
The Definitional Dilemma 
Dispute resolution schemes have proliferated over the last decade. For the dispute resolver and for the 
consumer of dispute resolution services life was simpler in regard to the choices available in the l 980's 
and even into the early 90's. One could negotiate, arbitrate, litigate, or mediate. When mediation and 
alternative dispute resolution began to enjoy "flavour of the month" endorsement, some dedicated 
litigators insisted that litigation was itself an alternative process, the rationale being that it was an 
alternative to the traditional way of settl ing disputes down the centuries, mortal combat . . .  
Dispute Resolution Processes and Definitions 
The mediation definition has remained fairly constant since the first mediation program was 
introduced in Australia in 1 980 and is quite [4] simple. However, for those seeking an understanding 
[sic] "what goes on" in mediation, this has become unnecessarily complicated and cloudy, due to 
initiatives to apply separate descriptions to different types of mediations such as "community 
mediation", "victim offender" mediation and to different philosophies applied and processes 
conducted under such banners as "expert mediation", "shuttle mediation" and so on. In order to not 
add to these complications, the definition of mediation discussed in this book is simple and traditional. 
The dispute resolution processes and guidelines discussed in this book include conciliation, facilitation 
and early neutral evaluation, as well as complaint handling guidelines. Dispute resolution processes, 
such as expert appraisal, arbitration, mini-trial and expert determination, are not discussed. This is 
because, with the exception of arbitration, these processes are not widely used, and are variations of 
each other. The titles of these processes do, in a sense, speak for themselves . . .  
NADRAC Definitions 
The National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) developed definitions 
"primarily to assist NADRAC in its advisory role to the Federal Attorney-General". It states that the 
definitions contained in its paper "are benchmark definitions which wil l  enable ready comparisons to 
be made regardless of the range of names which might attach to particular ADR processes". This is to 
"encourage a shared understanding of the particular [5] process under consideration or discussion". 
NADRAC's definitions have assisted with clarity and have been drawn on to describe the dispute 
resolution process discussed i n  this chapter. 
Some practitioners argue that it really does not matter what process is adopted or what it is called, 
since the expression "mediation" is generic. This overlooks the Trade Practices Act provisions which 
contain the requirement to deliver to customers the particular service which is contracted to be 
provided. The NADRAC definitions should put an end to such arguments. 
Mediation 
Mediation is a process by which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a neutral third party 
(the mediator), identify the issues in dispute, develop options around these issues, consider 
alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement which encompasses the underlying needs and 
interests of the parties. 
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The neutral mediator has no advisory or determinative role in the content of the dispute or the 
outcome, which is entirely up to the parties. The mediator may, however, determine the mediation 
process, that is the steps and stages involved in the process, whereby resolution is reached or 
attempted. 
In order to avoid complicating this description it is not intended to elaborate on the definition except 
to mention a couple of mediation methods in the interest of clarity: 
Co-mediation 
Co-mediation encompasses the description of general mediation. The only difference is that two 
neutral third parties (the mediators) conduct the session. The co-mediation model is commonly used 
in community mediations, matrimonial matters, disputes over wills and in some multi-party matters. 
There are many rationales in support of the co-mediation model, one being "two heads are better 
than one". In a mediation involving matrimonial concerns, the co-mediators may be a male and a 
female. This is said to assist the parties in regard to a perception of gender balance, in that one or other 
of the parties does not feel disadvantaged by having a solo mediator of the opposite sex. [6] 
Shuttle Mediation 
NADRAC defines "shuttle mediation" as a separate process in itself. In shuttle mediation the parties do 
not meet face to face, but are located in different rooms and the mediator "shuttles" between them 
conveying the parties' viewpoints, settlement ideas and financial offers. Another shuttle method is 
where the mediator meets the different parties at different times for all or part of the process. The 
mediator in fact acts as a messenger. 
However, there is no doubt that some mediators, under the guise of traditional mediation, use this 
method for the majority of the mediation session. The parties [sic] face-to-face contact is restricted to 
opening statements and to the closing stages. This practice is identified in this book as "shuttle 
mediation". 
Expert Mediation 
According to NADRAC, the role is- the same as with any mediator, including the neutral ity obligation. 
However, using the AS 4608-1 999 description of concil iation, the third party may have input into the 
resolution by using his or her substantive expertise. 
There are differing views on the benefits or otherwise of having an "expert" mediator, conduct a 
mediation. One school of thought is that a competent mediator should be able to mediate in any 
dispute regardless of the subject matter. This view is based on the premise that the mediator has no 
decision-making role and is merely in charge of the process, not the content. 
Further, concerns about "experts" have been expressed in regard to the temptation to bring their own 
long-held views into the forum, compromise their neutrality, structure the mediation in a manner to 
coincide with their view and steer the parties and the process to such an outcome. 
On the other hand some parties may feel comfortable with a person who they feel has some expert 
knowledge and understands the particular technical language and concepts. Certain complicated 
technical terminology may baffle a dispute resolver who is outside the technological loop and this may 
be detrimental to the efficiency of the process. Familiarity with the subject matter of a dispute may 
assist the dispute resolver in their reality testing role. 
Separately, some government agencies, such as those operating a mediation program under a 
particular statutory scheme, may [7] conduct mediations along traditional lines, but provide the 
option for the mediator to call upon a third party, usually a departmental employee, to provide 
information on the legislative boundaries which may affect their decision making. 
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The Strata Schemes and Mediation Services Branch has developed this useful option in their program. 
It provides the opportunity to clarify any legislative uncertainty, and can operate as a reality test to the 
more creative ideas which the parties have contemplated, thus promoting greater workability of this 
agreement. 
Conciliation 
This term often applies to matters which are the subject of a complaint, but not exclusively so. 
Complaint conciliation contrasts with dispute concil iation or expert mediation in the sense that in the 
latter processes there are usually two parties with a mutual dispute. In  a complaint, there is usual ly one 
party who is aggrieved and a complaint target who, up to a certain point, may not have perceived that 
a dispute exists, but who may either voluntarily or by statute take part in the conciliation process with 
the aim of achieving a resolution. 
The process employed by the dispute resolver in a complaint conciliation may be exactly the same as 
that in traditional mediation. Where a dispute exists, the conciliator is normally an expert in the subject 
matter of the dispute and can offer advice and suggestions as to the manner of resolution. This is 
discussed under "Expert Mediation" above. 
In some statutory conciliation programs, the conciliator is empowered to make suggestions as to the 
terms of settlement, provide advice on likely settlement terms and may actively encourage the 
participants to reach an agreement which accords with their own ideas or the requi rements of the 
statute under which the conciliation is attempted. 
Each agency would have its own terms of reference in this regard. For example, the NSW Health 
Conciliation Registry uses the classic mediation process and the concil iator has no advisory or 
determinative role. Other programs have different practices which accommodate a customised 
appl ication to their particular program (for example: Financial Services Complaints Resolution 
Scheme, Family Cou rt, Equal Opportunity Commission, Aged Care Dispute Resolution Scheme). In 
some statutory schemes, participation may not be voluntary for a respondent to a complaint. It may 
be mandatory to attend once the complaint has been processed. [8] Processes employed under the 
conciliation banner do not always involve a face-to-face meeting nor even the parties speaking directly 
to each other at all . The conciliator may act as the conduit who speaks to one party at a time, usually 
by telephone, and transmits concerns and ideas from one party to the other without the parties 
actually speaking together. This is a variation on shuttle mediation. A confusing aspect is that this 
process can be described by a particular agency as "mediation", "facilitation" or even "case 
management". 
Telephone conciliations can involve a three-way conversation whereby the conci liator conducts the 
meeting and assists the parties to speak together, minus the face-to-face contact. 
Facilitation 
There are several processes to which this term can apply: 
• Generally, facilitation is undertaken with a group of parties. The facilitator is neutral in the sense of 
not usually having an advisory or determinative role. The task forthe facilitator may be to identify 
problems to be solved, tasks to be accomplished or d isputed issues to be resolved. The facilitation 
process may conclude at this point and another process is then followed, or the facilitator may go 
on to assist the parties to develop options and consider alternatives in an endeavour to reach 
agreement. Sometimes the facil itator may suggest options, drawing on what the parties have said. 
• A facilitator may be employed to assist in planning meetings being held by a company or 
organisation. The group of planners may have a mutually desired outcome, but have diverse views 
on priorities or how a desired end might be achieved. 
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• Facil itated negotiation is a process in which the parties to a dispute, who have already identified the 
issues to be negotiated, utilise the services of a facil itator to assist in negotiating the outcome . 
., A dispute resolver is sometimes employed to facilitate a public meeting, committee meeting or a 
workshop. A group of residents, for example, may be in conflict amongst themselves or may have a 
common interest whereby they seek to put their views to a government instrumental ity via a public 
meeting. In the committee meeting context, a board of an organisation may be in dispute amongst 
themselves and require a neutral person to assist the flow of the meeting and ensure that everyone 
has the opportunity to put a point of view or a particular person or faction is not allowed to 
dominate. [9] 
• A facil itator in the workshop context is not strictly a dispute resolver, but acts more as an [sic] wheel 
oiler to promote interaction from the audience and dilute any tendency to dominance by particular 
audience participants. 
0 An intake worker whose role is confined to bringing a matter to the mediation or conciliation table 
is described as a facilitator in some programs. The role here is to co-ordinate the holding and the 
arrangements for a meeting, usually following an approach by one of the parties to a dispute. The 
facil itator (so-called) wi l l  then contact the other party and discuss the benefits of a meeting. This 
person may have the role of supplying the names of several suitable mediators. The facil itator may 
then assist the parties in choosing a mutually agreeable person and then proceed to arrange the 
details of the meeting. A more appropriate term for such a person would be "co-ordinator". This 
would avoid confusion with the dispute resolving or dispute prevention role of a facilitator, 
although such a co-ordination needs to have negotiation and dispute resolution skills simply to get 
al l  parties to agree on arrangements. 
Arbitration 
This is a process in which the parties to a dispute present arguments and evidence to a neutral third 
party (the arbitrator) who makes a determination. An arbitrator can be part of a court-annexed 
scheme, or the parties may choose an arbitrator who is not necessarily legally qualified. The choice of 
arbitrator may be based on his or her particular expert knowledge of the subject matter, for example 
an engineer or accountant. 
Arbitration is a process which is most often confused with mediation in the public mind. The media 
commonly uses the term "arbitration" when it is in fact mediation that is the process being employed. 
As the two processes are the most diametrically opposed of al l  the alternatives, such erroneous 
references continue to perpetrate the definitional confusion. Of all the "alternatives", arbitration is a 
process as close to judicial determination as one can get and is often not classed as ADR. 
Early Neutral Evaluation 
Some Australian courts have an early neutral eva luation program for matters in the court list. This 
involves engaging an evaluator, usually a legal practitioner, who specialises in or practices extensively 
in the subject matter of the dispute, for example wills and estates. The process involves each side 
putting their case before the evaluator. 
[1 O] The eva luator first encourages the parties to settle the matter along consensual lines and may take 
on a chair person's role at this point. If settlement does not occur through this consensual means, the 
evaluator will produce his or her evaluation of the likely court outcome based on what he or she has 
heard on the merits of each side's argument. The parties may then negotiate or attempt to negotiate a 
settlement based on the evaluation. Early neutral evaluation is a cousin to processes called expert 
appraisal or expert determination. 
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Med-Arb 
This is shorthand for a process where mediation and arbitration are combined in one session. It is 
normally employed by statutory bodies dealing with consumer or injury claims or administrative 
appeals. The dispute resolver may first encourage parties to settle via a normal (although often 
truncated) mediation process. If settlement does not eventuate the mediator then has the power to 
give advice on outcomes or even impose a decision. 
However, the process may be described as "mediation" to the parties and they may believe they are 
entering into a traditional mediation process. "Med-Arb" is a term which may be understood by 
insiders practising dispute resolution. It is not one which would be familiar to consumers, even though 
it is a process which is increasingly practised as statutory schemes continue to prol iferate, particularly 
where there is a time limit on the session. Colloquially, it has been described as "speediation". 
Statutory ADR Schemes 
Many statutory ADR schemes now exist. It is not possible to set out all or any of the variations a 
particular agency may inject into the classic equation. Cost considerations may mean that a time-limit 
is imposed - thus the "speediation" element operates. Whether they are described in the 
organisation's literature as "mediation" or "conciliation", it is important for a person entering into a 
dispute resolution process under the scheme, or for that person's adviser, to check out the actual 
process to be followed and which they are expected to enter into. Many programs, run under the 
mediation or conciliation umbrella, may be conducting programs which operate somewhat differently 
from the simple or classic definitions described. Is the "mediation" being offered the classic process in 
which the parties take responsibil ity or is it something else, such as a Med-Arb arrang ement? Is the 
proposed "conciliation" a face-to-face process, a telephone hook-up or a "no contact" shuttle 
method. 
[1 .85] Another important reason to embark upon the process of accurately defining dispute 
resolution processes arises because of the development of standards for practitioners o f  
dis�ute resolution. A fuller discussion on standards being adopted by the dispute resolution 
profession will be discussed in Chapter 15 of this book. However, the following excerpt 
rounds out the discussion on defining dispute resolution and, in particular, mediation. 
Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice 
[1 .90] L Bou lie, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 201 1 )  
PP 1 3-1 5 .  
There are several reasons for difficulties in defining o r  descri bing mediation. At the outset the term 
itself can refer to three different phenomena. It can refer to a set of aspirational values and principles 
such as self-determination and empowerment which could be operational ised in problem-solving or 
dispute resolution situations - an aspirational approach to the concept. It can refer to an analytical 
process involving discrete stages, steps, skills and techniques which mediators can contribute in 
problem-solving situations - the procedural approach. It can also refer to the occupational practice 
carried out by different kinds of mediators in different setti ngs and with wide variations in procedure 
and mediator conduct - the occupational approach. As shown in the text there are divergences and 
inconsistencies among the aspirational, procedural and occupational approaches to mediation and its 
essential significance . 
An early problem in capturing the definitional essence of mediation lay in the d ifficulty of obtaining 
direct information about what occurred in practice as most mediations are conducted on a private and 
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confidential basis. This lim itation has declined over time under the glare of surveys, case studies and 
increasing references in  court decisions to what transpires in practice. Nonetheless, mediation remains 
a relatively unobserved and unobservable practice. 
Another reason for definitional problems is found in the flexibility and open-ended nature of the 
language and terms used in defining or describing mediation. While these have some core areas of 
certainty they also contain a high degree of indeterminacy which precludes full clarity of boundaries. 
Concepts such as 'party self-determination' and 'mediator neutrality' have elastic meanings, as later 
discussions indicate, and the differences are exacerbated when mediation is examined in different 
cultures and legal systems. 
[1 4] A further reason is the fact that mediation theory is derived in large part from other disciplines 
such as psychology and law, game theory and decision science, anthropology and sociology. While 
mediation theory draws from these disciplines in its theory construction, it is sti l l  developing its own 
explanatory and justificatory foundations. Mediation therefore lacks a strong sense of its essential 
attributes and is still constructing a coherent theory and accepted set of core features which enable it 
to be differentiated from other processes. 
An additional reason is that the term 'mediation' is used in different senses by different groups and 
factors such as economic and professional self-interest cause groups to define and describe mediation 
for their own partisan purposes. There are political dimensions to defining and describing mediation 
which cause its meaning to be pulled and pushed in the service of different sectoral interests, such as 
lawyers, government agencies or community organisations. The different 'spheres of meaning' 
compete with one another for political control and hegemonic domination. 
Final ly, there is enormous diversity in mediation's practice. Clients adopt it for different purposes, 
mediators have significant variations in background, training, techniques and operational style, and it 
operates in varying social and legal contexts. In  Australia mediation is encountered in high-end 
commercial disputes, in anti-discrimination cases, in neighbourhood conflicts, in problems among 
school students, and in numerous other social circumstances. There are significant differences 
between the situations of private commercial mediation and statutory forms of institutionalised 
mediation. The former are usually well-resourced, have few time limitations, and are often conducted 
by lawyer mediators; some forms-of the latter are conducted by highly-trained mediators but resource 
and time limitations can render the process 'poor, short and nasty'. 
This diversity of Australian mediation practice has contributed to the definitional challenges. As 
important as any theoretical or statutory definitions are operational definitions. These emerge from the 
actual practice of mediation, the intentions of those who promote it, and the attitudes and beliefs of 
mediation educators and trainers. What high-status mediators do in their practices, and are known to 
do, also influences the way mediation is defined. The process is being fashioned and shaped in the 
contrasting circumstances of commercial and family disputes, of private and agency-based services, of 
highly-priced and free services, of lawyer and counsellor mediators, and both with and without the use 
of professional advisers. 
There is sometimes talk of 'classical mediation' or the 'orthodox mediation process' or the 'standard 
model of mediation', with other versions being [1 5] regarded as adaptations to, deviations from, or 
vulgarisations of the norm. However, while there are clearly limits to what can be classified as 
mediation, it is d ifficult to insist on the narrow orthodoxy these terms imply. 
Despite the difficulties there remain imperatives to define mediation in numerous settings. These 
include situations in which various closely- related forms of dispute resolution are juxtaposed in 
legislation, in court and industry schemes and in multi-staged dispute resolution clauses: for example, 
mediation, concil iation, arbitration and case appraisal are all options in a single court context.' 
Differentiation is logically implied where there is more than one form of dispute resolution in a single 
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context and practically impelled where there are compliance requirements and legal consequences 
flowing from the choice of process. Moreover, standard-setting and the increasing regulation of 
mediation require definitions for the sake of consistency and uniformity - neither mediation nor other 
ADR processes can be regulated unless they are first defined or described. Mediation standards 
general ly, and accreditation systems such as the NMAS in particular, rely on inclusive definitions of the 
system. 
--- £0� ---
SELECTING A DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 
[1 .95] Another issue related to defining processes of dispute resolution and the hybridisation 
of dispute resolution is the concept of "fitting the forum to the fuss" .  This concept means 
simply first determining the type of dispute the disputants are dealing with and then matching 
the right dispute resolution process to the dispute that will best serve the disputants and give 
them the best chance of resolving the dispute. Often this means evaluating the disputants 
themselves and, based on their personalities, abilities and relationship with the other 
disputant, matching them with a dispute resolution mechanism that will serve them well. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
[1 .100) T Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (4th ed, Lawbook Co., Sydney, 201 2) pp 446-4521 . 
Should an ADR Processes be used 
A threshold issue is whether an ADR processes should be used. It has been suggested that there are 
certain disputes that should never be referred to ADR processes. NADRAC has indicated that this issue 
is an important one to consider when creating standards for mediators. Many professional ADR 
organisations have also considered this issue. For example, the "Let's Talk" group in Sydney has 
proposed a professional code of conduct for mediators. In the "Let's Talk" code, there was some 
discussion about disputes where mediation may not be appropriate: 
• Mediation may not be suitable for all conflicts or for all parties. If a mediator in consultation with 
the parties makes an assessment at any stage that mediation is not suitable, a mediator has a 
responsibility to not commence mediation or to end the mediation session. 
• Examples where such an assessment may occur include where: 
- a person is put at risk by the participation, or the safety of the person is in doubt, as a result of 
the mediation; 
- a participant's mental capacity is impaired by drugs, alcohol, psychological disorder or 
emotional disturbance resulting in their inabil ity or incapacity to negotiate in their best 
interests and on their own behalf; 
- the power imbalance is such that it will significantly and adversely affect the negotiating 
abil ity of the party; 
- the parties are not willing to participate or negotiate or are unable to reach a negotiated 
agreement; 
- another dispute resolution procedure may be more appropriate. 
Arguably, the emergence of much more comprehensive screening and assessment tools in the family 
area (see Chapter 3) do not focus as much on whether ADR is [447] appropriate but instead on how it 
takes place. However, there are issues about whether intake and assessment are part of the mediation 
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process and whether these processes are also covered by protections in relation to confidentiality and 
admissibility (see Chapter 1 2). In respect of all ADR processes, additional criteria have been proposed 
that raise issues about the need for publ ic, adjudicative, and binding processes. These criteria are: 
• when a definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is required for precedential value, and the 
ADR process is not l ikely to be accepted generally as an authoritative precedent; 
• when the matter significantly affects persons or organisations that are not parties to the ADR 
process; 
• when there is a need for public sanctioning of conduct, or where repetitive violations of statutes 
and regulations need to be dealt with collectively and uniformly (this could arguably promote a 
test-case approach where some disputes are determined within the court system and others are 
referred to ADR processes); 
• when a party or parties are not able to negotiate effectively themselves or with the assistance ofa 
lawyer. 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales ADR referral criteria were developed in 1 995 by the author of 
this book. The criteria recommended that the premise of "no case is not suitable for referral" should 
operate in the first instance. The decision to specifically advise and recommend parties of ADR options 
could be positively exercised after reference to a checklist of factors in respect of each proces$. 
What Type of ADR Process? 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales, in  its 1 995 ADR Steering Committee Report, recommended 
developing positive criteria for referral [448] to ADR processes. Factors favouring referral to mediation, 
evaluation and arbitration have been developed and are detailed below. 
Factors favouring mediation 
Relevant factors favouring referral to mediation include whether: 
• the matter is complex or l ikely to be lengthy; 
• the matter i nvolves more than two parties; 
• the parties have a continuing relationship; 
• either party could be characterised as a frequent litigator, or there is evidence that the subject 
matter is related to a large number of other disputes; 
• the possible outcome of the matter may be flexible and differing contractual or other arrangements 
can be canvassed (poor compl iance rates in similar types of matters could be considered in respect 
of this factor); 
• the parties have a desire to keep a matter private or confidential; 
• the parties can reach a view as to l ikely outcomes should the matter proceed further - that is, 
whether it is an appropriate ti me for referral; 
• the dispute has a number of facets that may be l itigated or argued about separately at some time in 
the future. 
In the family law area, it was previously proposed that mediation not be used, or, more recently, (see 
Chapter 3) that safeguards be put i n  place where: 
• there is a h istory of violence or fear of violence between parties; 
• there are allegations of child abuse or sexual abuse, or a serious personal pathology; 
• a party is unwil l ing to honour basic guidelines of the mediation process; 
• "one of the parties is so seriously deficient in  information that any ensuing agreement would not be 
based on informed consent"; 
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• the parties are not bona fide and the process is used as a "fishing expedition"; 
o counselling or therapy may be required; 
" the parties may reach an i l legal agreement or disadvantage an unsuspecting third party. 
Factors favouring (non-binding) evaluation and conciliation 
Relevant factors favouring evaluation and conciliation include whether: 
• the matter involves expert or legal issues; [449] 
o liabil ity is not an issue; 
a an expert opinion has previously been sought (if it has, and the dispute relates to a difference in 
expert opinion, then evaluation by an expert may be particularly helpful); 
• a party to the d ispute is a government entity or an insurer; 
o the parties have a desire to keep a matter private or confidential. 
Factors favouring arbitration 
Relevant factors favouring referral to arbitration include: 
0 whether an insurance company is liable in fu ll or part; 
0 where receiving a binding opinion is relevant; 
• where parties wish to avoid negotiations with the other side; 
0 where a matter involves the quantification of a dispute. 
There is also a clear l ink between the objectives of different programs and the contents of the referral 
criteria. For example, the primary objective of the fi rst Early Neutral Evaluation program that 
originated in the Northern District of California was: 
not settlement but rather . . .  to promote early, efficient and meaningful communication 
about disputes and to make parties and counsel confront and assess their situations early and 
realistical ly. 
Under these circumstances, it is l ikely that the objectives of the program would dictate that broad 
referral criteria operate. The general objectives discussed in Chapter 1 may also assist to create 
additional referral criteria. 
Ripeness for Referral 
The question of the timing of any referral process is usually acknowledged as an important factor in  the 
eventual resolution of any dispute. "Ripeness" for mediation is said by some writers to be an important 
factor. However, this factor may be less important than previously thought. Goldberg and others have 
indicated that it is not necessary for all issues to be apparent and readily addressed to enable processes 
such as mediation to succeed. 
However, in the past mediation referral programs have cited "the stage which the case has reached" 
and the "extent of time pressure for resolution" as [450] im portant factors in determining 
appropriateness for mediation. This may be partly because, in  some instances, disputants may need to 
incur costs to appreciate the issues involved in the litigation. Also, as one respondent to a survey 
relating to the Commercia l Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales has noted: 
The higher level of legal costs helps to focus a party's mind on the "real ity" of expensive, 
time-consuming litigation. 
Awareness of legal costs and other potential costs (loss of opportunity and profit costs, costs in stress, 
management time costs) can be important in  providing an incentive to negotiate or med iate. In  
addition, ripeness considerations may relate to the emotional state of the disputants and whether or 
not, for example, a grieving process has commenced or been completed (in respect of a lost 
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relationship). Some ADR processes can assist parties to move through cycles of change and prompt 
development of outward-looking approaches. For those within the litigation system, the provision of 
hearing dates and interlocutory events may provide a "sword of Damocles". 
It is probable that "ripeness" should be considered in the context of any referral process; however, it 
should also be weighed against the cost savings that may occur in any referral .  It may be that 
re-referral mechanisms which can be triggered after a determination that a matter is not "ripe" are 
necessary. The lack of contingency fees in Australia may also make "ripeness" a more important factor 
than is the case in United States systems. 
"Ripeness" will also be relevant in determinative processes such as arbitration. A lack of information in 
such processes can have an impact on whether they can [451 ] proceed. However ADR processes can 
have an important catalytic effect and may prompt early action and discourage "languishing" by 
ventilating issues. Ripeness is also an important factor in determining where referral processes should 
operate - in a multi-door court, a multi-option site, or in combination with an array of referral 
procedures. In terms of the timing of referral, it has been noted that it seems to 11 • • •  be accepted that 
there is no automatically right or wrong time for referral; however, a system of automatic referral at a 
certain stage in the litigation process will inevitably result in some inappropriate referrals" . 
--- 5-:G)Q:i ---
[1 . 1 05] When parties decide to use a dispute resolution process, notwithstanding the matters 
raised in the previous extract, they may simply select a dispute resolution process based on the 
level of: 
• informality; 
• consensuality; 
• intervention. 
In this respect parties have the flexibility to choose a process that will best suit their needs. 
Those needs may revolve around the level of informality available to explore a wide variety of 
materials pertaining to the dispute, which, in a court of law, may be prevented by the rules of 
evidence. Further, a party may just enjoy a more informal setting in which they can explore 
options for settlement rather than get bogged down in facts and the history of the dispute. 
They may also prefer a process that is more consensual in its approach to resolution, that is, a 
process that seeks agreement between the parties as the basis of resolution as opposed to 
having a solution imposed on them. Finally, parties may prefer a process that features less 
intervention from a third party neutral and which seeks to ensure that the parties themselves 
drive the process and the outcome. Conversely, they may prefer a process that ensures a higher 
level of intervention, which will not require of the parties an onerous level of participation. 
Figure 1 . 1  sets out the degree of informality, consensuality and intervention in the most 
popularly practised dispute resolution processes in Australia. 
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various dispute resolution processes 
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[1 . 1 1 0] In relation to the term "dispute resolution" as it used in this text, unless otherwise 
stated, the term will be used in its generic sense to mean any form of non-curial dispute 
resolution. Thus, expert determination, referencing out (or refereeing), arbitration and 
litigation, are not classed as methods of dispute resolution unless otherwise stated. The 
inclusion of chapters dealing with these methods, other than litigation, is to ensure a full 
picture is given of all processes outside court proceedings. Further, in relation to litigation, 
judicial review by the many tribunals set up at federal, State and Territory levels is not to be 
included in the term "dispute resolution'' . However, mediations, conciliations and other 
non-adjudicative processes held within the purview of those courts and tribunals are of course 
included within the term "dispute resolution" .  
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
(1 . 1 1 5] Dispute resolution has been adopted, or some might say appropriated, by the legal 
profession. Under the various statutory dispute resolution schemes, the lists of mediators, 
conciliators and arbitrators are dominated by lawyers. The various courts and tribunals in 
Australia are themselves encouraging their own judges, registrars and members to be trained 
in dispute resolution, such training being conducted both locally and overseas. The Victorian 
Law Institute and the NSW Law Society has for a number of years held the "spring offensive" 
and "settlement week" respectively where, with the co-operation of the courts and legal 
practitioners, litigants pursuing matters in the court lists are offered the opportunity to resolve 
their disputes via mediation. 
Solicitors and barristers in all jurisdictions in Australia are embarking upon training in 
dispute resolution to better represent their clients at the various dispute resolution processes 
being offered both privately and in the public space. Most State and Territory Law Societies 
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and Institutes and Bar Associations have dispute resolution committees that promote the use 
of and professional development in dispute resolution. 
The dispute resolution processes themselves have taken on the aura of legal proceedings in 
terms of legal representation, the limits of confidentiality and disclosure and the contractual 
style settlement agreements drafted upon resolution. In every way, dispute resolution is 
generally being conducted in "the shadow of the law". In the following extract Professor 
Laurence Boulle explains more fully the notion of dispute resolution operating in the shadow 
of the law. 
Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice 
[1 . 1 20] L Boul le, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Butterworths, Sydney, 
201 1 )  pp 1 85-1 87. 
Despite portrayals of mediation as an alternative to law and litigation, it always operates in the 
'shadow of the law'. The expression signifies different [1 86] factors: that in mediation parties operate 
with some understanding of their legal rights and obligations, with an expectation of how the dispute 
would be resolved through the legal process, and with some knowledge of the time, costs and risks 
associated with litigated outcomes. It also signifies that there may be subsequent litigation on matters 
arising in mediation such as unlawful party conduct, breaches of confidential ity and challenges to 
enforceability of mediated settlements. Final ly, it suggests the potential relevance of the legal system 
for al l  mediations, for example in relation to judicial interpretations of ADR legislation, Agreements to 
Mediate and relevant court rules. In a more symbolic sense law's shadow is also relevant in legitimising 
certain narratives encountered in dispute resolution, namely those consistent with dominant social 
values, and in marginalising others which are inconsistent with them. In all these respects mediation is 
said to operate in the shadow of the law. 
The extent of the law's shadow varies considerably. The shadow will be deep where a dispute has 
been packaged and defined as a legal one, where lawyers have taken active roles in its processing, 
where each side has Senior Counsel's opinion and where mediation takes place on court referral or 
with involvement of a court or tribunal official. The deep shadow extends a strong legalism to the 
operation of mediations, with negotiating parties influenced by a dispute's likely litigated outcome, 
and there are greater prospects of subsequent litigation whether or not mediation produces a 
settlement. Where mediation involves a neighbourhood or organisational dispute with little legal 
content and it is conducted through a community dispute resolution service, the shadow of the law, in 
all its senses, wi l l  be much weaker. 
There is therefore a dialectical relationship between mediation and the legal system. Despite the 
legal shadow overhanging mediation, its existence constitutes both a complement and a challenge to 
the formal system. As Alexander points out, ADR and mediation interact interdependently with the 
justice system and their procedures and phi losophies have reshaped the contours of legal processes. 
While ADR might have led to reductions in court hearings and changes in the work practices of some 
courts, the introduction of mediation into civil procedure systems has revitalised the litigation process. 
There is evidence that while litigants have a preference for ADR processes over litigation in many 
situations, the use of ADR processes has also increased satisfaction with litigation. The informal ity and 
flexibility of mediation and [1 87] its potential time and cost savings have contributed to reformulations 
of court rules and practice directions. The exposure of legal practitioners to mediation has caused 
some lawyers to become less legal istic, more client-centred, more collaborative and more self­
reflective. 
There is also evidence that the language of mediation has changed aspects of legal discourse. This 
has been evident in terminological changes in family relations, from 'custody and access' to 'residence 
and contact', and more recently to 'parenting arrangements for the children'. There is some evidence 
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of substantive law changing under the influence of mediation practice, for example towards 
acceptance of shared parenting arrangements for children which had previously been avoided and for 
which there is now a statutory presumption. Another aspect of mediation's influence on the formal 
justice system derives from the fact that in providing a 'competing' dispute resolution process it has led 
courts to become more concerned about efficiency, effectiveness and client satisfaction; they now 
inform the public about their services and even promote their 'products' in the dispute resolution 
market. 
The influence of mediation and ADR and the changing functions of the courts can challenge 
constitutional principles. The further development of litigation management systems and court­
connected ADR, and in  particu lar the evolution of judicial resolution and mediation systems, may be 
lim ited by Ch I l l  of the Commonwealth Constitution, as may be additional changes to the basic 
featu res of the adversarial system. The roles of judges as case managers, as facilitators of settlements 
and as mediators have yet to be called into question in terms of constitutional principle. If this does 
occur it may be found that there are l imits on the extent to which there can be further combinations of 
litigation, case management and mediation at the Commonwealth level .  
--- f(.')("1 ---
[1 .1 25] Despite the fact that much dispute resolution is practised in the shadow of the law, it 
is not only legal practitioners who are involved and not all dispute resolution processes are 
legalistic in nature. For example, the work of the Community Justice Centres of New South 
Wales and the Queensland Dispute Resolution Centres, albeit funded by the respective 
Attorney-General's  Departments and accepting many referrals from the New South Wales 
Local Court and the Queensland Magistrates Court, strive to keep their mediations out of the 
shadow of the law. Their focus is very much on reaching a consensual agreement between 
parties, often in a form not found within the court structures, who are predominantly people 
living within the same community. 
Further, private provider organisations, such as UniFam and Relationships Australia, 
although government-funded to varying degrees, seek to assist families by offering, amongst 
other things, mediation services that help people avoid costly litigation. However, even these 
service providers, while being client-driven, are required to ensure that their mediators meet 
the practice requirements of the Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioners) 
Regulations 2008 (Cth) - a new system of accreditation that came into force on 1 July 2009 
which sets out the qualifications of family law dispute resolution practitioners operating under 
the Family Law Act 1 9 75 (Cth) . 
[1 .1 30] Practising dispute resolution in the shadow of the law raises the issue of how a 
lawyer' s  role in a dispute resolution process sits with the role of the same lawyer representing 
a client in the adversarial justice system if the dispute proceeds to litigation. Given that lawyers 
are trained in adversarial justice, the question arises as to whether lawyers are ill-equipped to 
participate in achieving consensual outcomes through dispute resolution. 
In their landmark paper Anne Ardagh and Guy Cumes suggest a more central and proactive 
role for lawyers engaged in the resolution of disputes. Further, they suggest some important 
factors for the structural reform of mediation in the legal sphere. 
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[1 .1 35] A Ardagh and G Cumes, "Lawyers and Mediation: Beyond the Adversarial System?" (1 998) 9 
Australian Dispute Resolution journal 72 at 73-79. 
Lawyers in Mediation 
Dissatisfaction with present legal processes and pressure from courts, government and the private 
sector for reform of the adversarial legal system have encouraged Australian lawyers to embrace 
mediation.  The movement of [74] lawyers into mediation may be seen as a desire to meet a changing 
demand and to control a perceived expanding area of legal services. The problem with lawyers 
moving into this area is that they bring their legal "baggage" with them, that is, their adversarial legal 
culture. Conflict is managed by lawyers within the domain of the law as they perceive it and as they 
have their cl ients understand it. In lawyers' education and management of disputes there is little or no 
recogn ition of parties' underlying needs and how these might be satisfied outside legal norms. Asking 
lawyers to practise facil itative mediation is anomalous without a radical change in legal education, 
philosophy, training and development of skills. Lawyers' concerns are with facts and certainty; from 
this follows a legal solution to the dispute. Mediation's focus is with feel ings and ambiguity; and from 
the drawing out of feel ings and perceptions comes resolutions to the conflict. If lawyers are to be 
mediators and/or to participate as lawyers in mediation sessions, a lessening of emphasis on olegal 
methods and solutions is necessary. 
Lawyers can practise in  relation to mediation processes in  the following ways: (a) lawyers as mediators; 
and (b) acting for a client within a mediation process. Lawyers as mediators can be divided between 
those who act as genuine neutral third persons to facil itate a dispute resolution process between two 
or more persons and those who "mediate" a dispute between their own client and another party (with 
or without representation) in an informal, ad hoc arrangement. If lawyers act as "mediators" in  the 
latter sense, in the absence of a third party neutral, the role they perform is merely to effect a 
settlement between disputing parties, rather than, permitting parties to express and develop a range 
of options arising from their own interests and needs. In other words, this is a misuse of the 
terminology and procedure of mediation: a lawyer cannot be a neutral where his or her own client is 
concerned and therefore any matter that should be mediated must be referred by the lawyer to an 
independent, neutral third person. 
The role of lawyers acting for clients within a mediation process facil itated by a third person has been 
analysed by Sordo who points out that the lawyer's role is one of advice in the mediation session rather 
than representation of a client. Acting in the clients' interests (which Sordo says is part of the lawyer's 
duty in mediation) may be problematic, if it undermines the client's independence of input. Med iation 
is the maximisation of the client's interests and needs as identified by the client, not the orchestrated 
presentation of a case by a lawyer on behalf of a client. There may be a conflict of interest between the 
lawyer's duty to a client and their duty to allow the free operation of a genuine mediation process. 
Sir Laurence Street has observed that lawyers who do not understand that their role is not one of 
advocacy are "a direct impediment to the mediation process" . 
Lawyers' traditional role is one of advice and representation in the area of substantive law and legal 
rights. There will always be a place for this. People do not always want to settle matters themselves; 
they look for an agent to act for them. Moreover, in the present system, citizens do not know how to 
proceed in the complicated procedures of the law. Additionally, citizens may not know that there are 
alternative dispute resolution methods. Hence they have no choice but to instruct a lawyer. 
[75] Given this traditional lawyer/client relationship, control by lawyers of mediation services may add 
an extra difficulty for citizens in their access to dispute resolution services. It could set up a barrier to 
personal, direct and inexpensive alternative dispute resolution methods. Further, it could be seen as 
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merely adding an extra arrow to the lawyer's quiver instead of giving citizens a real choice of services 
or a real alternative to the legal culture. The q uestion then is: will lawyer mediation merely become a 
further tool and tactic in the adversarial p rocess? 
Criticism has been levelled at what some see as an "ADR industry" occupied by "opportunistic 
lawyers" usurping the field of mediation: "the colonisation of mediation by lawyers in government 
and private practice . . .  will mean that mediation skills will become professional artifacts ... locked up 
within the lawyering role, not to be shared, but to be given down, at a fee" . It can be argued that 
lawyer mediation is a way of containing and preservi ng dispute resolution services within the 
profession and infusing legal culture into general dispute resolution processes. 
It is of l ittle value to the consumer to take a dispute to a lawyer who starts a legal process which costs 
the client in lawyer's fees, court fees, time, emotion and entrenchment of positions; then to be referred 
by the court during the course of the proceedings to mediation. Such a referral to the Law Society 
Mediation program in New South Wales incurs a financial cost of several hundred [sic] of dollars. 
Lawyers' control of this process is amplified by the requirement that the Law Society panel of 
mediators is restricted to New South Wales solicitors. 
Lawyers should, at the very least, not have a monopoly on dispute resolution services. There are other 
helping professions and dispute resolution services which involve _different non-legal skills which can 
be applied at different times or stages of a dispute. The existence of other dispute resolution services 
prevents the exclusive domination of the field by lawyers and provides an alternative, beyond the 
adversarial system. 
Beyond the Adversarial System: A New Ideal 
Litigation is a process, which includes both pretrial and trial stages of legal proceedings. Although the 
final stage of litigation is the trial, the litigation process commences at a very early point in the lawyer's 
contact with the client. All the stages of the process are contained within an adversarial culture. 
Mediation as typically used by lawyers is but a stage in the litigation process, not beyond the 
adversarial system. 
We advocate as an ideal a distinct and separate process of facil itative mediation within a structure 
which is beyond the adversarial system, outside the control of legal practitioners and outside 
traditional legal processes. This structure could include lawyer-mediators, but not be restricted to 
them or controlled by them. 
One form of this model may be the incorporation of early dispute resolution services within the court 
structure. However, in order for this to be an alternative to the adversarial system, it would need to be 
accessible, free and community based; informal and separate from adversarial legal processes; not [76] 
merely a referral from legal proceedings to med iation, but a genuine, first instance of dispute 
resolution involving non-court personnel. 
Such an ideal mediation service can be distinguished from the so-called "ADR industry" including 
lawyer-mediation. The latter is a form of professional, private ownership of dispute resolution. 
Mediation as an alternative to the adversarial system should apply the principles of fairness through 
the provision of inexpensive, equitable, efficient and speedy access to justice. If mediation is to be 
beyond the adversarial system, more basic reform is needed than simply giving lawyers short courses 
(four days) in mediation processes. Nevertheless, short courses may serve an educative function for 
lawyers about mediation processes. According to recent research, lawyers have limited experience in 
referring cases to mediation, representi ng clients in a mediation and acting as mediators. 
Structural Reform 
The fundamental prem ises of reform must be based upon structu ral reform and the key principles of 
fairness. The principles of an ideal alternative structure, distinct from lawyer-a nd/or court-annexed 
mediation, include: 
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0 Non-extension of an initial chosen professional practice (for example, law) 
The practice of mediation should be independent of (outside of) any other professional practice. 
e Provision of a philosophical rationale for mediation 
Mediation is based upon a set of philosophical premises that are quite different from traditional lawyer 
practice. Lawyers are paid to fix other people's problems, to manage and eliminate conflict, rather 
than to facil itate individual resolution processes. Conflict is categorised and compartmentalised by 
rules and legal remedies and resolution is sought through the tactics of law-based solutions. In  
contrast, mediators have no stake in  the dispute or in the desirability of having it  resolved. They view 
disputes as an opportunity for others to restructure or reframe their social, personal, business or 
organisational relationships. 
• Provision of specialised skills and training 
Mediators are trained from the outset to facil itate discussion between disputants with a view to 
encouraging them to see the other person's point of view and to negotiate a fair result, not a win/lose 
situation. Lawyers act on the instructions of, and in the interests of, their clients and their skills are 
developed to maximise their potential to win or to achieve the most favourable result for their client. 
[77] 
• Support for a system that is organisationally based 
An organisational basis means that mediators are initially selected, employed with and responsible to a 
director or manager. They are given lengthy standardised training and if deemed suitable are selected 
for accreditation for an initial trial period. Reaccreditation may be possible. Such a model exists within 
the New South Wales Attorney General's Department (Community Justice Centres) and in other 
Austra lian jurisdictions, for example, the Australian Capital Territory. This model could be either 
extended or it could be adapted within the organisational structure of courts. This would establish 
mediation as a form of free public ownership of dispute resolution which would involve a partnership 
between community and government, based upon the notion of public trust. 
Lawyer-mediators are basically self-selecting and lawyer-mediation training has not been standardised 
or accredited. In fact, this was rejected by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission a few years 
ago. To quote one lawyer-mediator, "the absence of uniform standards and lack of any general 
standards or monitoring means that there is no guarantee of competence by people ca lling 
themselves specialists, nor any bar to any of us (lawyers) holding ourselves up as experts" . The same 
author notes that, in contrast, New South Wales Community Justice Centres do not allow mediators 
who were trained many years ago "to sit on a panel until kingdom come without any training or 
reassessment occurring". 
s Institution of a legislative base 
Legislation ensures accountabil ity and control of the process of mediation and of the mediators. This 
includes supervision of mediators in the sense that they must account for each session which they 
conduct by way of a written report to a co-ordinator who is responsible for reading each report and 
following up where necessary. This is an important part of qual ity control, consumer protection and 
community service. 
Lawyers are not supervised as mediators or accountable to an organisation in the sense that each 
mediation session they perform is overseen by a manager or regulatory process. Lawyer-mediation is 
essentially self-regulatory, although the legal profession and lawyer mediation in the broad sense is 
regulated by law societies which provide guidelines for lawyer-mediators. 
0 Encouragement of community representatives as mediators and enhancement of the 
democratisation of the justice system 
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Wide community participation in dispute resolution is analogous to the jury system, employing people 
with non-legal backgrounds as direct participants in the justice system. It also ensures broader 
consumer confidence and trust in the system. 
Principles of Fairness 
Principles of fairness include the following: 
• accessibil ity of persons to dispute resolution mechanisms and services in terms of affordability, 
equity and fairness; [78] 
• efficient and speedy resolution of disputes; 
• empowerment - the control by the disputants of the dialogue, the ownership of the outcome and 
the ability to make real choices; 
• participants' knowledge and understanding of the process; 
• personal and active (rather than passive) participation; 
• principles of natural j ustice; 
• impartiality of mediators and the opportunity to be heard. 
What these fairness principles require for lawyers is that in order for persons to have affordable, 
equitable, efficient and speedy resolution of disputes, lawyers need to apprise clients of, and be willing 
to refer them immediately to, mediation services, rather than starting into litigation processes. The 
dilemma here is that the lawyer stands to lose the client (that is, the business opportunity). 
Lawyers need to inform clients of alternative processes to the resolution of their disputes in order to 
empower them, allow ownership of their own disputes and give them the opportunity to exercise real 
choice. Only in this way can clients have the knowledge and understanding of all available processes of 
dispute resolution. 
In order for clients to hear each other and participate without hindrance, a lawyer's role within the 
mediation process should be l imited. Perhaps it is preferable that lawyers not be present in the 
mediation so long as the client has the opportunity to consult a lawyer either during the process, or 
after it, about any formal agreement to be made. 
These considerations raise the question whether legal issues and procedures can be separated from 
what, the parties really or ideally would want. While ever lawyers participate in mediation, their 
background, training and professional and ethical obligations wi l l  almost always require the law to 
take precedence over the client's non-legal interests and needs. In those cases where law and 
procedure can be separated from parties' interests, for example, in a dispute over access, to children, 
or a dispute over the provision of a service, adversarial representation and mediation without legal 
representation should be quite separate processes. 
Conclusion 
In this article we have examined, first, the role of lawyers in  mediation and questioned whether the 
participation of lawyers in mediation sessions is different from the traditional negotiation and 
settlement practices of lawyers and, second ly, whether mediation by lawyers effects real change in 
society, in legal culture and in the structure, cost and control of dispute reso lution processes. We have 
argued that mediation could be a real alternative to the adversarial system if established as a 
formalised, structured dispute resolution system, independent of the legal profession. This requires a 
partnership between the community and the state and a new paradigm of dispute resolution, beyond 
the adversarial system, where mediation is accessible and understandable. 
[79] This proposal may create a dilemma for lawyers if it requires them to choose between their role as 
traditional lawyers or as mediators. Can they do both equally well? It has been observed that "it is 
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difficult to understand . . . how lawyers can become mediators on the basis of qualifications and 
experience in a discipline which is, in fact, the antithesis of mediation". For lawyers to be mediators, 
legal education needs to provide training and skills to enable lawyers to be dispute resolvers in the 
broadest sense. Perhaps such education may lead to a profession, divided into mediators and 
litigators, that is, the alternative dispute resolvers as opposed to the traditional lawyers. 
Ultimately there needs to be fundamental change in the way lawyers proceed if we are to move 
beyond the adversarial system. Facilitative mediation is a process which addresses many of the 
deficiencies of the adversarial system. Lawyers have a critical role in fostering or hindering its 
development as a primary dispute resolution system. Presently the incorporation of mediation as a 
stage within the adversarial system retards meaningful reform of the legal system. Mediation must be 
realistically incorporated into primary dispute resolution processes at the earliest stages of a dispute, 
actively embody principles of fairness and ideally be structurally separate from adversarial processes, 
practices and institutions. We advocate a rethinking of the relationship between lawyers' practice and 
mediation in order for real change to begin. 
--- £0� ---
[1 .140] The reference by Ardagh and Cumes that standards and accreditation do not apply to 
mediation conducted by lawyers or others was remedied by the introduction in 2008 of the 
Approval and Practice Standards for mediators. This now means that lawyers and others 
seeking to act as mediators for the courts and other statutory schemes must be accredited by 
the National Mediator Accreditation Scheme. This will be further discussed in Chapter 15 .  
The principles of an ideal alternative structure as discussed by Ardagh and Cumes are still 
relevant today, as are their principles of fairness. It is material to note that their first fairness 
principle, that of access to dispute resolution, has yet to be achieved. Only those people or 
organisations that are financially able can access court annexed dispute resolution, as 
proceedings need to be commenced to allow such access. While State and Territory 
governments have taken the responsible decision to set up community or neighbourhood 
justice centres, these are generally restricted to low level community-type disputes, leaving out 
the vast number of people iri civil and commercial disputes that cannot afford to commence 
proceedings in court. Australia still has a long way to go to provide non-curial dispute 
resolution to the financially disenfranchised masses. 
[1 .145] If one accepts that the roles of the lawyer, that of advocate for adversarial justice and 
of non-curial dispute resolution can be reconciled, then the next issue is whether dispute 
resolution is part of the practice of a lawyer and if so, do lawyers have a duty to advise their 
clients about dispute resolution options before accepting instructions to proceed to litigation? 
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[1 .1 50] D Spencer, " Liability of Lawyers to Advise on Alternative Dispute Resolution Options" (1 998) 
9 Australian Dispute Resolution journal 292 at 292-298. 
Introduction 
All lawyers in Australia assume several duties upon being admitted to their respective Supreme Courts. 
The objects of these duties include clients; the respective courts of admission; other members of the 
profession; and, some say, the public. One of the many duties lawyers have to their clients is the duty 
to advise them in a competent manner. This usually means providing clients with the correct legal 
advice, setting out their rig hts and the benefits or otherwise of the various forms of dispute resolution. 
It could also be said that the duty to advise includes peppering any such advice with a view to 
resolving disputes in the shortest possible time and with a minimum of cost to the client . . .  [29 3] 
Is ADR Part of Legal Practice? 
Lawyers have become the natural adoptive parents of ADR. Disputes have a tendency to climax in 
court action and the architects of litigation are clearly lawyers. In this respect, lawyers have an 
understanding of the adversarial problem-solving techniques employed by most courts in the Western 
world and they have an understanding of legal and evidentiary issues which may have a bearing on 
the effectiveness of an ADR process. Hence, from a philosophical and practical viewpoint, lawyers are 
inextricably linked to ADR. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that lawyers dominate the practice of 
ADR in Australia. 
The l ink between lawyers and ADR is now so well established that organisations such as Lawyers 
Engaged in ADR (LEADR) conduct ADR training courses especially for lawyers who may be involved in 
representing their clients, or who wish to become ADR practitioners themselves. The New South Wales 
Law Society has a Dispute Resolution Committee which advises on policy issues involving ADR, as well 
as maintaining a panel of third party neutrals. On 30 August 1 995, the New South Wales Law Society, 
in conjunction with the New South Wales Law Foundation, launched the Mediation Information Kit. 
The kit states its aims and objectives as being "to disseminate information among the legal profession 
on the use of mediation to promote negotiated settlement of disputes and the early resolution of 
litigated matters." The kit also lists reasons why practitioners should use mediation, the second of 
which states, "expansion of solicitors' practices by the provision of an additional service as an 
alternative to litigation particularly in situations where litigation is neither cost-effective nor desirable." 
The kit contains several documents setting out the Law Society's mediation model, guidelines, 
precedents, mediation initiatives, index of government and non-profit organisations offering alternative 
dispute resolution, and recent legislative developments in the field of mediation and early neutral 
evaluation. Page 1 of the guidelines states: 
[294] The Council [of the Law Society of NSW] has approved the revised guidelines and 
resolved that the activity of mediation by solicitors, subject to the revised guidelines, be 
declared to be appropriate to be undertaken as part of a solicitor's practice. 
From the information contained in the mediation information kit, it would seem that the New South 
Wales Law Society sees the use of mediation as a method of expanding the business of lawyers by 
providing additional services. It is also clear that it sees ADR as being a legitimate part of legal practice 
. . . One way of establishing whether mediation is part of the practice of law is to consult the insurers of 
lawyers, that is, those who determine what areas of practice are deemed to be within the purview of 
legal practice and therefore to be included under the insurable heads of cover. In  New South Wales, 
solicitors pay professional indemnity insurance through the Law Society's Master Policy, which 
provides that those solicitors who, as part of their legal practice, act as med iators will be entitled to 
indemnity under that insurance policy. 
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Further, solicitor lawyers who conduct mediations under the Law Society's Mediation Program (such 
as the various settlement week activities and when mediating under the Society's model dispute 
resolution clause) are specifically covered under the Law Society's Errors and Omissions Policy which 
covers all the Law Society's activities. 
In answering the in itial question of whether ADR is part of the practice of law, we are now in a position 
to draw on some conclusive proof that would allow us to answer the question in the affi rmative. First, 
there is the phi losophical argument that lawyers are proponents of ADR by virtue of their professional 
involvement in litigation. Secondly, the existence of the New South Wales Law Society's Dispute 
Resolution Committee is proof that the lawyers' governing body considers that ADR forms part of legal 
practice. Thirdly, the New South Wales Law Society has produced a Mediation I nformation Kit which 
encourages lawyers to advise their clients of mediation options and provides specific instructions for 
their conduct . . .  Final ly, specific directions under the New South Wales Law Society's Master Insurance 
Pol icy go to some lengths to advise lawyers that they wil l  only be covered for [295] professional 
indemnity insurance if, when acting as a third party neutral, they do so as part of their ordinary course 
of legal practice, and not as a business in its own right. 
Another persuasive argument that ADR forms part of legal practice is its adoption by the courts 
themselves. Most States of Australia have passed ADR legislation which generally provides that courts 
may refer matters in their lists to a variety of ADR processes, most commonly, mediation, early neutral 
evaluation and arbitration. Many courts have formed panels of ADR practitioners for use in 
court-referred ADR and a high proportion of those practitioners are lawyers. 
Given the above evidence, it is possible to state that ADR is considered by the legal profession as a 
legitimate part of the practice of law. After establishing this hypothesis, it is now possible to move on 
and pose the question, do lawyers have a duty to advise clients of ADR options? 
Duty to Advise 
[There are] two important issues in  the question of the duty to advise clients of ADR options. The first is 
the subject of competition for services. If lawyers do not advise of ADR options, then clients will seek 
that information from other lawyers or non-lawyers. The second issue is that of lawyers leaving 
themselves open to professional negligence actions. These two issues are compelling reasons for 
lawyers to advise clients of ADR options . . .  [296] Australia is experiencing a growth in ADR legislation 
and service providers . . .  many individuals and organisations are using ADR clauses in contracts, or 
seeking out the services of ADR providers to avoid lengthy and costly litigation . .. the various 
representative bodies of lawyers, the judiciary and the legislature have accepted the role of ADR in the 
practice of law and are encouraging its use . . .  [297] In an effort to reconcile the dilemma a lawyer has 
between the duty to the client to advise of the most cost-efficient methods of resolving the dispute 
and the potential loss in fees through giving such advice . . .  the solution lies in the philosophical 
underpinnings of the legal profession. That is, "As a profession, the lawyer must subordinate his [sic] 
self-interests to those of the client" he suggests that the benefits of ADR are that lawyers can dispose of 
their cases more efficiently, have fewer problems in recovering fees with clients who are l ikely to be 
more satisfied with the fees and the professional service, and participation in a process that is more 
professionally satisfying than the traditional adversarial one. 
Indeed, as more and more clients recognize the advantages of ADR, they may expect their 
lawyers to discuss the appropriateness of alternative procedures and use them when in the 
client's best interests. The failure of lawyers to do so may find the soph isticated client 
shopping for a new lawyer. 
The Hon Mr justice de Jersey, of the Queensland Supreme Court, delivered a similar but more 
vehement message to the Australian Bar Association, at the ABA Conference in 1 990. His Honour fired 
a poignant salvo at the Bar, stating that the public perception of lawyers is that they take matters to 
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court because they earn more money. In  this respect the public have become distrustful of lawyers. His 
Honour made it clear that the Bar holds a privileged position in society because it serves the vital public 
interest, but, "Unfortunately at the moment it is not serving that interest to a large extent. That is 
because fees are so high that middle income earners are denied recourse to the courts." Justice de 
Jersey suggests that embracing ADR solutions wou ld assist to promote the public interest as well as 
justifying the Bar's privileged position in society. His Honour, like other ADR advocates, concedes that 
the use of ADR equates to a reduction i n  the costs of legal services. However, he suggests that the Bar 
seize the benefits of ADR, namely, the prospect that the reduction in legal costs may enhance the 
public perception of the Bar, as well as increasing the Bar's capacity to serve the public interest. His 
Honour sounds a warning to lawyers who do not embrace ADR: "Lawyers who plough on in the 
traditional way do so at their peril. The peril is that they will lose their clients. They will end up with 
dissatisfied clients. Word will get around. They will be perceived to be interested principally in large 
fees. I think that a clear sighted recognition of the ADR trend is important to the future of the Bar." 
[298] His Honour states that the rationale of survival is the wrong reason to embrace ADR, and goes on 
to suggest that helping litigants is a better reason. 
[The] second issue is that of the threat of litigation against lawyers who do not appropriately advise 
their clients on ADR options. This issue is generally of great concern to- lawyers as litigation can not only 
result in damages payouts affecting cash flow and insurance premiums, but in the case of a lawyer 
struck from the roll of legal practitioners, the ability to practice law ad infinitum. However, is this a 
realistic outcome for a fai lure to advise appropriately? Given that society is allegedly becoming more 
litigious, commentators on the development of ADR bel ieve it is very much a realistic outcome where 
a client is dissatisfied with the litigation process. Two American family lawyers are on record as saying: 
The lawyer's duty to advise a [domestic relations] client about the option of private mediation 
is a key element of the family lawyer's ethical responsibil ity, and that the failure to do so could 
result in malpractice exposure. 
Moberly goes further and states that not only could a failure to advise of ADR options be the subject of 
a malpractice or negligence suit, but could result in charges of violation of professional responsibil ity. 
Proving such charges will be discussed later. Needless to say, such a threat over a mere fai lure to advise 
is cause enough for any lawyer to think twice before omitting to give advice on ADR options. 
While there appear to be some proponents of the view that failure to advise should constitute, and will 
constitute when tested in court, some form of professional misconduct, there are others who disagree. 
New Jersey lawyer Michael Prigoff believes that making a failure to advise punishable by professional 
discipline and/or a negligence suit is placing too much of a burden on lawyers. He suggests that there 
are al ready enormous burdens p laced on lawyers when acting for clients to avoid any al legation of 
negl igence. He cites the requirement of a written costs agreement in every matter as one of those 
burdens, a situation recently repl icated in New South Wales with the 1 993 amendments to the Legal 
Profession Act 1 987 (NSW). To enable a client to sue successfully for negligence because the lawyer did 
not advise of ADR options would mean lawyers having to embark on lengthy, and costly, verbal and 
written advice to clients. At a time when lawyers are being criticised for increasing legal costs, this 
requirement would do nothing to assist in the more cost-efficient del ivery of legal services to clients. 
It is interesting to note that Prigoff agrees with Professor Sander on the professional obl igation to 
advise clients accord ingly and he concedes that he himself always discusses ADR options with every 
litigation client. His main concern seems to be the formalisation of that process, brought about by 
leg islatively enshrined sanctions: 
[T]he proposal to make this responsibil ity a matter of professional discipline or malpractice 
liability is overkil l  and unfair micro-management of the practice of law. In  the real world of 
clients and lawyers, it unfairly burdens the Bar and will prove counterproductive to the goals 
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sought by ADR, at least with respect to smaller disputes. 
--- £0� ---
[1 .1 55] If it is agreed that lawyers have an obligation to advise their clients about non-curial 
methods of resolving disputes, what becomes of the lawyer engaged to mediate and the role of 
that lawyer as an "expert" in mediation and the law? Is the lawyer as mediator expected to 
provide legal advice, particularly when a party's rights are being compromised in mediation? 
Noone picks up on this critical point in the following extract and traverses the issue of 
immunity from liability for lawyers acting as mediators. 
Lawyers as Mediators: More Responsibility? 
[1 .160] M A Noone, "Lawyers as Mediators: More Responsibility?" (2006) 1 7  Australasian Dispute 
Resolution journal 96 at 1 00-1 03. 
Legal Practitioners as Mediators 
The legal profession was initially skeptical of the developments in ADR. The development otmediation 
was in part a reaction to the traditional adversarial legal dispute system. People were dissatisfied with a 
number of aspects of the legal system, including the dominating and controlling role of legal 
practitioners. But in less than a decade, the legal profession had co-opted and embraced mediation 
into the scope of its professional services. The establishment of organisations like Lawyers Engaged in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (LEADR), the development of specialist sections within legal professional 
associations and development of courses on ADR in law schools are all indications of the 
institutionalisation of mediation. A number of lawyers act as mediators but a much larger [1 0 1 ]  
number are now involved in mediations representing their clients. Mediation is now an integral part of 
the litigation process. 
Status of a Legal Practitioner 
The legal profession is a regulated and licensed occupation and to practise law a person must first be 
"admitted to practice" (a one-off event) and then annually obtain a "practising certificate". 
Unqualified legal practice is an offence punishable with up to two years imprisonment. 
When a person is admitted to legal practice they become an officer of the court. As a result of this 
status, a legal practitioner owes various duties to the court and the administration of justice. These 
duties include acting with frankness, candour and honesty in relations with the court, and not 
engaging in abuse of process or bringing administration of justice into disrepute. Concurrently a legal 
practitioner has a fiduciary relationship with his or her client. A lawyer owes undivided fidelity to the 
client's interests, unaffected by personal interests or any other person. They are bound by strict codes 
of fiduciary duties including confidentiality and conflict of interest. 
Lawyers' Liability 
Legal practitioners are bound by both legislative and common law duties and codes of behaviour. 
Lawyers' duties of skill and care are derived both from the contract of retainer (a tortuous duty to take 
reasonable care) and as a fiduciary. Lawyers, like psychologists and other professionals who act as 
mediators, remain liable for breaches of their own professional codes of conduct. Some State law 
societies have adopted guidelines for solicitors who act as mediators and a breach of these could 
warrant a finding of unprofessional conduct. For i nstance, it is generally accepted that legal 
practitioners should not act as a mediator in a case involving their own client, although this is not 
specifically prohibited. 
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Similarly, the Law Council of Australia's Ethical Standards for Mediators states that a mediator must 
disclose all actual and potential conflict but can proceed if the parties agree and the mediator 
considers he or she can properly discharge his or her duties. In the comment to the standard, it states 
(inter alia): 
In particular a mediator who is a partner or an associate of any representative retained by 
either of the parties should not act as mediator without the fully informed consent of al l  
parties. 
This approach contrasts with the basic fiduciary principle that, in a contentious matter (a dispute), a 
lawyer or the lawyer's firm must not represent two or more clients whose interests may conflict. 
The justification for the departure from this principle for lawyers in mediation might be (as noted by 
the judge in Tapoohl) that, absent some specific ag reement, a mediator does not act for a party in the 
same sense that a lawyer acts for a client. 
The mediator is required to stand back from this conflict, to assist the parties to resolve it; it is 
not to promote the interests of one party perhaps to the disadvantage of the other. 
However, this issue is not so straightforward if the mediation is evaluative or the mediator proffers 
advice or encourages certain settlement options. [1 02] 
Lawyers ' Immunity 
Lawyers generally cannot contract out of liability for services they provide. At common law, lawyers 
cannot, by means of an exclusion clause in the retainer agreement, reduce their standard of care or 
exempt themselves from liability for default in the performance of their professional responsibilities. In 
Victoria, lawyers are legis latively prohibited from contracting out of liabil ity to their cl ients unless this is 
permitted by other leg islation such as the professional standards scheme. 
[A]n Australian lawyer . . .  must not make any agreement . . .  with a client to the effect that the 
. . .  lawyer wi l l  not be liable to the client for any loss or damage caused to the client in 
connection with legal services to be provided . . .  but for the agreement the . . .  lawyer would 
be liable. 
If a lawyer does enter into such an agreement, it is said to be void. 
Three policy reasons for prohibiting lawyers from limiting their liabil ity are: (a) public confidence in 
lawyers and the justice system would be diminished if lawyers could avoid actions for negligence by 
having a broadly worded exclusion clause in the retainer agreement; (b) the public service aspect of 
professionalism is inconsistent with the notion that lawyers can exclude liability to their clients; (c) and 
by including an exclusion clause in the retainer, the lawyer is putting personal interests above those of 
the cl ient, which is a conflict of interest and duty. Although there have been attempts to include 
exclusion clauses in retainer agreements, the courts have not accepted them. 
The one exception to unlimited liabil ity for legal practitioners is the advocate's immunity. The High 
Court recently affi rmed the principle that barristers and solicitors are immune from claims of 
negligence in relation to conduct in court or conduct intimately related to court. This is in contrast to 
developments in the Un ited Kingdom and New Zealand, where the immunity has been abolished or 
diminished. The reasons for maintaining the immunity were the "unique and essential function" of the 
judicial system as part of government structure in the "quelling of controversies" and a concern to 
have "final ity" . Previous policy grounds used to support the immunity were disregarded. 
Issues for Lawyers Acting as Mediators 
Although there are no cases which set out the standard of care required of lawyers who act as 
mediators, the cases governing lawyers' standard of care may give some guidance. The standard of 
care is that of a qualified, competent and careful lawyer in the given circumstances in the practice of 
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their profession. A lawyer is not guilty of negligence merely because they have committed an error [of] 
judgment unless that error is gross. If a lawyer holds themselves out as an expert, they wi ll be subject 
to a higher standard of care than a non-expert. 
The promotion of lawyers as mediators by their professional organisations for "their special skills, 
training and experience" would imply a level of expertise above that of other mediators. It is likely that 
the standard of care required of them will be high. Additionally, it is likely that the courts will impute a 
term into the agreement to mediate to ensure that the service (mediation) will be provided with a 
higher standard of care and skill where mediators hold themselves out as having particular expertise or 
knowledge in the subject matter. [1 03] 
Detail of the appropriate standard of care needs to address aspects of process, legal advice and 
protection of rights. Much will depend on the nature and form of the mediation. For instance, when a 
mediator is developing options, considering alternatives and leading participants toward settlement, 
can they provide legal opinion? 
If real ity testing really means bestowing legal advice or making statements such as "in my 
experience the court will not give you that" to what extent can the mediator be held 
accountable if their views are erroneous and should such assertions be made in any event? 
The response to these questions will depend on the nature of the mediation being undertaken and 
whether the parties are legally represented. As noted previously, evaluative mediation is more likely to 
give rise to actions against the mediator from parties who claim they were given "bad advice". There 
seems to be general agreement that restricting the mediator's involvement in matters of process 
entails fewer liabil ity risks for the mediator. Once a mediator provides legal advice to the parties, the 
standard could become that of a lawyer acting in a conventional legal practice. If this is the situation 
then the lawyer may face professional conduct issues, such as conflict of interest. 
It is common practice for mediators to get the parties to sign an agreement to mediate. One of the 
clauses in these agreements grants immunity from liability. However, when the mediator is a legal 
practitioner, there is real doubt about the appropriateness and lawfulness of such exclusion clauses. 
Lawyers are not generally permitted to limit their liabil ity and yet the Law Societies' precedents contain 
such an exclusion clause: 
The mediator will not be liable to a party for any act or omission in the performance of the 
mediator's obl igations under this agreement unless the act or omission is fraudulent. 
There is a stark contradiction between unl imited liability in most areas of legal work and limited liability 
when lawyers work as mediators. Given the recent High Court case on advocates' immunity it seems 
most unlikely that when these exclusion clauses are tested a court would find them valid. As the High 
Court i l lustrated, they discounted a range of public pol icy reasons that had previously justified the 
immunity, including the special status of lawyers performing advocacy; impl ications for standards of 
advocacy; divided loyalty; the witness analogy; and the flood gates argument. The critical pol icy 
reason underpinning their decision to retain the advocates' immunity was the need to have finality of 
the "quelling of controversies" by the courts. 
On the basis of this reasoning, it is unl ikely the courts would support immunity for a lawyer acting as a 
mediator. The courts could see this as abrogating their critical role within the justice system and would 
not support an immunity that prevents them from having the final say on disputes. As a result, the 
validity of these exclusion clauses in the agreements to mediate between lawyers and the parties is 
most uncertain. 
Additional ly, the relevant legal professional indemnity insurance schemes provide cover for mediations 
conducted by lawyers if they form part of the normal work of the legal practice. Given this approach, 
it would seem illogical for lawyers to simultaneously be permitted to sign agreements containing 
exclusion clauses. The public pol icy reasons generally prohibiting exclusion clauses in a lawyer's 
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retainer could apply equally in the context of a lawyer acting as mediator signing an agreement with 
the parties. This is the case especially if one or more of the parties are not legally represented. [1 04] 
Conclusion 
[l]f a mediator remains within the confines of the pure mediation model, immunity is 
unnecessary. The very definition of mediation protects the mediator from liabil ity. A 
mediator's role is to assist the parties to reach mutually acceptable settlements. 
The extent of potential liability of mediators is stil l  open to speculation and most uncertain. It is 
unlikely to be tested before the courts while there is widespread use of immunities for mediators. 
However, the use of immunities is subject to critique and the extent of the immunity is l ikely to change 
in the future. 
When lawyers act as mediators, they need to be conscious and cautious about their mediation style in 
order to avoid potential liability and fulfil their professional responsibil ities. In  all other areas of their 
work, they act for one client, are partisan, and give advice. In mediations, lawyers need to be mindful 
of the need to be impartial and treat the parties fairly without bias. To prevent the prospect of claims 
against them, lawyers acting as mediators need to practice facilitative mediation and clearly 
differentiate their role as mediator from that of legal advisor. 
The prospect of a court finding that a lawyer acting as a mediator has fiduciary duties may well be 
higher because lawyers are often chosen for their expertise, knowledge, skills and their familiarity with 
the nature of fiduciary duties. This includes an understanding of the duties of trust and confidence. 
Lawyers need to be vigilant in identifying conflicts of interest irrespective of the Law Societies' 
guidelines. 
Finally, the impact of a lawyer's duties as an officer of the court has not yet been fu l ly explored in the 
context of mediation. However, lawyers who act as mediators should be concerned about the 
lawfu lness of exclusion clauses in ag reements to mediate. More importantly, lawyers acting as 
mediators should fulfil their professional responsibilities and not seek immunity in mediation. In the 
context of the general critique of mediators' immunities, lawyers should be enhancing the 
administration of justice by leading the way and deleting these clauses from their agreements to 
mediate. 
--- f001. ---
[1 .165] Dispute resolution is part of legal practice and lawyers have a duty to advise their 
clients of non-curial methods of resolving disputes. Lawyers may be liable to clients should 
they confuse their role of court advocate with dispute resolution advocate, and in the latter 
case, adopt an evaluative form of dispute resolution that seeks to advise parties rather than 
allow parties to reach their own conclusion to the dispute. Alternatively, can lawyers wear 
"two hats" and competently represent clients in both adversarial and consensual proceedings 
in and out of court? Cooper explores this issue in the following extract. 
The 'New Advocacy' and the Emergence of Lawyer 
Representatives 
[1 .1 70] D Cooper, "The 'New Advocacy' and the Emergence of Lawyer Representatives in ADR" 
(201 3) 24 Australasian Dispute Resolution journal 1 78 at 1 81 -1 86. 
Professional Obligations of Lawyers as Dispute Resolution Advocates 
There are several key obl igations that lawyers owe to their clients when representing them in 
negotiations, mediations and concil iations, the following are those most relevant to the current 
discussion. [1 82] 
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The Duty to Consider Settlement 
Wolski asserted that lawyers owe a duty to their clients to consider settlement. This is supported by the 
Law Council of Australia's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice: 
A practitioner must where appropriate inform the client about the reasonably available 
alternatives to fully contested adjudication of the case unless the practitioner believes on 
reasonable grounds that the client already has such an understanding of those alternatives as 
to permit the client to make decisions about the client's best interests in relation to the 
litigation. 
These model rules are not binding on legal practitioners, but there are mirror provisions contained in 
professional conduct rules throughout Australia that are binding and enforceable. Duties of lawyers to 
encourage clients to consider settlement are also contained in legislative obl igations in most areas of 
Australian law. It is this duty that imposes an onus on lawyers to work with clients to ascertain the niost 
appropriate dispute resolution processes for their dispute and to advise them of the advantages and 
disadvantages of these alternatives. There may be particular reasons why in some cases court 
proceedings must be preferred - for example, where the other client is not prepared to make full 
disclosure of essential information or where there is extreme urgency and the case will be prejudiced 
by any delay. 
The Duty of Loyalty to the Client 
Perhaps the obligation most relevant to this discussion is that legal practitioners owe a duty of loyalty 
to their clients and must act in their client's best interests to advance their cases. The Law Council of 
Australia's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice state: 
A practitioner must seek to advance and protect the client's interests to the best of the 
practitioner's ski l l  and dil igence . . .  
This notion of acting in the client's best interests was described by Moynihan J in Legal Services 
Commissioner v Baker. 
The lawyer should put the client's interest first and treat the client fairly and in good faith, 
giving due regard to a client's position of dependence upon the practitioner. 
This obligation remains relevant in dispute resolution settings outside of court. As Madarlane stated, 
"[t]here is no lessening of the lawyer's responsibility to achieve the best possible outcomes for his 
client in client resolution advocacy" . 
It is this duty that must be at the forefront of dispute resolution advocates' minds. Although trained as 
to the advantages of integrative negotiation and collaborative and problem-solving [1 83] approaches, 
legal practitioners must . ensure that their clients achieve the best possible outcomes, subject to 
following their instructions. Madarlane describes this in terms of "the goal of the conflict resolution 
advocate is to persuade the other side to settle - on her clients' best possible terms". 
Dispute resolution advocates will to some extent a lways be, "adversaries" because lawyers, on 
opposite sides of legal cases, have obl igations to remain loyal to and promote the interests of their 
clients. As a commercial litigator has explained: 
I see a completely different form of adversary process. You can cal l  it a mediation because 
we're working together to come up with a deal, but we're still adversaries - I'm sti l l  trying to 
get the best possible deal that I can. 
A distinction can be drawn, however, between lawyers as adversaries acting in their clients' best 
interests and lawyers behaving in an adversarial manner that some might argue is more appropriate in 
a courtroom. The latter is not suitable conduct for dispute resolution advocates; for example, 
antagonistic questioning of a client imitating cross-examination. Madarlane certainly envisages that 
lawyers as "conflict resolution advocates" fall within a non-adversarial practice framework. Following 
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this approach, at this stage of the investigation, dispute resolution advocacy can continue to be 
described as fal l ing within the realm of non-adversarial practice. 
The Duty of Competence and Diligence 
In recent times, specific g uidelines have been developed for dispute resolution advocates that fall 
within the general duty of competence and di l igence. The Law Council of Australia has produced 
Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations, which are not binding and state that "[i]t is not intended that that 
the guideli nes derogate in any way from the usual obligations imposed on lawyers by law or any 
eth ical rules, professional conduct rules or standards" . In relation to the role that lawyers should play in 
mediation, they provide: 
Mediation is not an adversarial process to determine who is right and who is wrong. 
Mediation should be approached as a problem-solving exercise. A lawyer's role is to help 
clients to best present their case and assist clients and the mediator by giving practical and 
legal advice and support . . .  The ski lls required for a successful mediation are different to those 
desirable in advocacy. lt is not the other lawyer or mediator that needs to be convinced; it is 
the client on the other side of the table. A lawyer who adopts a persuasive rather than 
adversarial or agg ressive approach, and acknowledges the concerns of the other side, is more 
l ikely to contribute to a better result. 
It is interesting to note that similar guidel ines in New South Wales espouse this same language and 
provide that the role of legal practitioners in mediation is: 
To participate in a non-adversaria l manner. Legal representatives are not present at mediation 
as advocates, or for the purpose of participating in an adversarial court room style contest 
with each other. 
It is argued that neither provision is completely accurate when stating that lawyers are not present at 
mediation as "advocates". Rather, it is suggested - that lawyers should not take on the role of 
aggressive adversarial advocates; however, it is fitting for them to act as assertive dispute resolution 
advocates or, as Macfarlane has termed them, "conflict resolution advocates". The reference to [1 83] 
participati ng in  a non-adversarial manner highl ights that the use of extreme positional bargaining or 
aggressive and hostile behaviour towards the opposing lawyer or client is  inappropriate in mediation 
settings. 
The Duty to Give Legal Advice 
The advantage of clients having legal representation during mediation and conciliation processes is 
that they have the benefit of legal advice before, during, and after the process. Lawyers can reality-test 
offers and counter-offers with clients and ensure they are aware of the pros and cons of any proposed 
settlements. They can advise as to how negotiation offers compare with l ikely court outcomes and 
weigh up the benefits of early settlement as opposed to paying the legal fees required to reach judicial 
decisions. 
Wolski has highlighted that this involves providing the client with information and advice to: 
enable the client to make informed decisions about what is, and what is not, in the cl ient's 
best interests by advising the client of the relevant law, the issues in the case, the client's 
possible rights and obligations, the options available to the client and the l ikely consequences 
of those opti ons. 
In this context, lawyers must be careful not to und uly coerce their clients to settle. However, it has 
been held that advice to accept a settlement "is not negligent merely because a court subsequently 
considers that a more favourable outcome would or might have been obtained if the original dispute 
had been litigated to judgment (or a more favourable compromise would or might have become 
available later)".  
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The Duty to Follow the Client's Instructions 
The final relevant obl igation is the duty to follow the client's instructions. This duty can conflict with 
lawyers taking collaborative and problem-solving approaches if clients have not been educated in 
these strategies. Lawyers must coach their clients as to how to engage in integrative negotiations. 
Legal practitioners are bound to follow their clients' instructions and this can cause difficult issues in 
dispute resolution when lawyers may perceive their clients have unrealistic expectations and are 
seeking improbable settlements. 
The New Advocate 
There are many examples of where lawyers will need to "advocate" for their clients in dispute 
resolution settings. In court-connected conciliation processes, lawyers often put forward positional 
offers, particularly where financial issues are concerned, and provide the relevant facts in support. 
Concil iators form views about appropriate ranges for settlement, based on this information. This is 
because legal negotiations generally take place in "the shadow of the law". If settlement is not 
achieved, concil iators may have to make recommendations for procedural orders, such as for the filing 
of further documents. If Party A is alleging that fu l l  discovery has not been made and Party B is 
withholding information, Party A, via his or her lawyer, will need to convince the concil iator that orders 
are required for the discovery of further documents, which may be crucial to a fair determination of 
the case. 
[1 85] Even in facilitative mediation processes where integrative negotiations are being employed, 
lawyers cannot always act "co-operatively" because they have overarching obligations to act in their 
client's best interests. Although the general aim of mediation is ""to reach an agreement which 
accommodates the interests - and needs of a l l  the disputants", this wi l l  not always be possible. In 
some cases an offer that accommodates the needs of one party may not meet the needs of the other 
client. An example is a family law scenario where both parents want the child to live with them for the 
majority of the time. On this particular issue, one parent will be a "winner" and one a "loser", even if 
the parents agree to a half-time arrangement because this was not the outcome that either party was 
seeking. Also a half-time arrangement, although a "compromise" in  terms of interest-based 
negotiations, may not be in the best' interests of the child. 
Wolski makes this point when stating that: 
However, it is not possible to rule out competitive negotiation and lawyer dominance in 
mediation . . .  and there is no absolute prohibition on lawyers acting competitively (rather 
than co-operatively) in mediation . . .  The primary obligation on legal representatives (aside 
from their duty to the court) is to further the interests of their clients. Sometimes a client's 
interests will be best, furthered by an adversarial advocacy approach, just as might be the 
case in negotiation . . .  An adversarial approach is al l  the more suitable in, settlement' and 
evaluative models of mediation. 
It is suggested that even an adversarial advocacy approach can fall within the realm of non-adversarial 
practice if one includes lawyer engagement in dispute resolution processes that occur outside court, if 
necessary to protect the client's best interests. 
This is not to say that aggressive adversarial behaviour or "zealous advocacy" should be promoted. An 
understanding of and an ability to implement integrative negotiation strategies and collaborative 
behaviour forms the core knowledge and skills of an effective dispute' resolution advocate. However, 
the role is a complex one and must be flexible and responsive to the particular situation at hand. In 
practice, not al l  lawyers are trained in integrative negotiation and, not al l  choose to implement this 
model. In some cases, legal practitioners may find themselves with opponents who are acting in 
aggressive and positional manners. In  such instances they may have to counter such tactics themselves 
with assertive or positional negotiation. Further, not al l  clients genuinely want to take a collaborative 
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approach and might be using a process such as mediation as a delaying tactic or "fishing" expedition. 
Although lawyers should not assist cl ients to use dispute resolution for such adverse means, they will 
need to be able to identify such tactics, learn how to respond to them and educate their clients on the 
benefits of taking a more collaborative approach. 
Conclusion: Dual Challenges 
The dispute resolution advocacy role of lawyers is an important one, particularly because the majority 
of legal disputes settle before reaching an adjudicated decision. The "new lawyer" and, in particular, 
the "new advocate" is spending the majority of the working week acting for clients in dispute 
resolution processes outside of court - that is, in non-adversarial settings. 
The analysis in this article has demonstrated that dispute resolution advocacy can be categorised as a 
subset of non-adversarial practice. Dispute resolution advocates will to some extent remain [1 86] 
adversaries and at times might have to advocate for their clients when seeking to obtain the best 
possible deal. They are, however, sti l l  engaged in non-adversarial processes in terms of dispute 
resolution as d istinct from adversarial court proceedings. Lawyer representatives acting in negotiation, 
mediation and conciliations should not engage in agg ressive "adversarial" behaviour that belongs in a 
court environment, such as antagonistic questioning or extreme positional bargaining. 
The challenge for lawyers is, as Macfarlane has argued, to become _accustomed to wearing "two hats" 
and be competent and efficient both when representing clients in judicial settings as "court 
advocates" and when acting for clients outside of court as "dispute resolution advocates" . It is 
suggested that in both settings they can engage in client-centred practice: take a problem-solving and 
holistic approach, identify the clients' underlying interests, and analyse the conflict. In each context 
they should identify the issues, formulate a dispute resolution strategy, and look for legal and non-legal 
solutions. When engaged in both forums, lawyers can be settlement-focused, seeking to resolve their 
clients' cases as quickly and cost-effectively as possible, while keeping conflict to a minimum. 
There is a challenge for law schools in training future lawyers to be competent not just in 
non-adversarial practice but also in the specifics of dispute reso lution advocacy. Ideally, law students 
would be introduced to non-adversarial practice at an early stage in their studies and then given the 
opportunity to learn higher level knowledge and skills in dispute resolution advocacy at the end of 
their degree, just before they enter the workplace. Future lawyers need to be educated about a range 
of models, including distributive negotiation, evaluative mediation, and conciliation processes. In 
addition, knowledge of their professional obligations and the skills to balance these duties is essential 
so that future dispute resolution advocates will abide by the duty of loyalty and seek to advance and 
protect their clients' interests, whether representing them inside or outside of court. 
--- ro� ---
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND PRACTICE 
[1 . 1 75] The Law Council of Australia represents the legal profession at the national level to 
promote the administration of justice, access to justice and general improvement of the law 
and, in executing these roles, it advises governments, courts and other federal agencies on 
ways in which the law and the justice system can be improved for the benefit of the 
community. The Law Council drafted a set of Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
Practice (Model Rules) in February 1 9 9 7. Between 2000 and 2002 a committee of the Law 
Council amended those rules, which were ultimately adopted by the Law Council on 
1 6  March 2002. 
The Model Rules seek to provide a national standard of conduct amongst legal 
practitioners and it was envisaged that this standard would ultimately be adopted by each of 
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the State and Territory law societies and the institutes. The Rules apply principally to legal 
practitioners practising as solicitors, or as barristers and solicitors. The term "practitioner" is 
used throughout to refer to persons practising as solicitors, or as barristers, or as barristers and 
solicitors or incorporated law firms. The Advocacy Rules, which are contained within the 
Model Rules, apply to all practitioners who are engaged in advocacy, whether or not their 
predominant style of practice is that of a solicitor or a barrister. In particular, Model Rule 12.3 
relates to the advice on dispute resolution alternatives to litigation and states: 
"12.3 A practitioner must where appropriate inform the client about the reasonably available 
alternatives to fully contested adjudication of the case unless the practitioner believes on 
reasonable grounds that the client already has such an understanding of those alternatives as to 
permit the client to make decisions about the client's best interests in relation to the litigation." 
Notwithstanding the differences between State, Territory and the federal jurisdictions, the 
following table illustrates the relationship between the Model Rules and those implemented by 
the State and Territory bar associations and law societies. While the Model Rules are reflected 
in most jurisdictional iterations, they have not been implemented verbatim in any jurisdiction. 
It is also noteworthy that there is considerable commonality between the Law Council's 
Model Rules and the Australian Bar Association's Model Rules of 2002. 
TABLE 1 .1 Law Council of Australia Table of Compliance with Model Rules 
Jurisdiction Relationship with the Law Council's Model Rules 
Australian Capital The Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory's Legal Profession (Solicitors) 
Territory Rules of July 2006 draw heavily on the Model Rules though they also contain several 
variations to account for specific local conditions. 
The Australian Capital Territory Bar Association's Barristers' Rules, consolidated in 
March 2006, draw heavily on the ABA's Model Rules 2002. The ABA's Model Rules 
are very similar to the Law Council's  Model Rules contained under the section headed 
Advocacy and Litigation. 
New South Wales The Law Society of New South Wales' Professional Conduct and Practice Rules which 
commenced December 2005, draw heavily on the Model Rules though they also 
contain several variations to account for specific local conditions. The New South 
Wales Bar Association's Barristers' Rules, consolidated April 2001, draw heavily on 
the ABA's Model Rules 2002. The ABA's Model Rules are very similar to the Law 
Council's Model Rules contained under the section headed Advocacy and Litigation. 
Northern Territory The Law Society Northern Territory's Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice of 
April 2002 draw heavily on the Model Rules though they also contain several 
variations to account for specific local conditions. The Northern Territory Bar 
Association's Barristers Conduct Rules of March 2003 draw heavily on the ABA's 
Model Rules 2002. The ABA's Model Rules are very similar to the Law Council's 
Model Rules contained under the section headed Advocacy and Litigation. 
Queensland The Queensland Law Society's Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule of July 2007 draw 
heavily on the Model Rules though it also contains several variations to account for 
specific local conditions. The Bar Association of Queensland's 2007 Barristers Rule of 
July 2007 draws heavily on the ABA's Model Rules 2002. The ABA's Model Rules are 
very similar to the Law Council 's Model Rules contained under the section headed 
Advocacy and Litigation. 
South Australia The Law Society of South Australia's Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice 
2003 of March 2003 draw very heavily on the Model Rules with only very minor 
adjustments to account for local conditions. The South Australian Bar Association's 
Barristers' Rules of September 2005 were developed by the South Australian Bar 
Association specifically for South Australia. They are drawn from a variety of sources 
including the ABA Rules and the Rules of various law societies. 
Tasmania In Tasmania, the Rules of Practice 1 994 set out guidelines for legal practitioners that 
are contained in State legislation independently of the Law Society of Tasmania. 
However, despite the introduction of the Legal Profession Act 2007, Tasmania has yet 
to incorporate the Model Rules to the extent of other States and Territories. 
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Victoria The Law Institute of Victoria Limited's Professional Conduct and Practice Rules, 
September 2005 (as amended) are based on the Model Rules though they contain 
several variations to account for local conditions. The Victorian Bar's Practice Rules 
of August 2005 are based on the ABA's Model Rules 2002. The ABA's Model Rules 
are very similar to the Law Council's Model Rules contained under the section headed 
Advocacy and Litigation. 
Western Australia Though the Law Society of Western Australia's Professional Conduct Rules of 
December 2005 cover broadly similar topics to those dealt with by Model Rules, it is 
by way of a different approach that leaves unclear to what extent the Model Rules 
were relied upon. The Western Australian Bar Association's Conduct Rules 2006 of 
February 2006 draw heavily on the ABA's Model Rules 2002. The ABA's Model 
Rules are very similar to the Law Council's Model Rules contained under the section 
headed Advocacy and Litigation. 
[1 .180) The Model Rules take into account the rise of dispute resolution within the space 
previously occupied exclusively by litigation. Under r 12.3, legal practitioners must themselves 
have an understanding of the various non-adjudicative methods of resolving disputes. 
In a further effort to establish a national legal profession, the Law Council of Australia has 
developed the Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules (Solicitors' Rules). These rules appear to 
supersede elements of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice, although do not 
explicitly state as such. The Rules were adopted by the Law Council in June 2011 and each 
State and Territory are encouraged to adopt the Rules to ensure a common standard of 
behaviour by all solicitors practising across Australia. To date, only South Australia ( adopted 
on 25 July 2011 )  and Queensland (adopted on 1 June 2012) have adopted them, with other 
States and Territories yet to follow. Rule 7.2 states: 
A solicitor must inform the client or the instructing solicitor about the alternatives to fully 
contested adjudication of the case which are reasonably available to the client, unless the 
solicitor believes on reasonable grounds that the client already has such an understanding of 
those alternatives as to permit the client to make decisions about the client's best interests in 
relation to the litigation. 
Like the Model Rules, the Solicitors' Rules are not laws. A breach of them does not result in a 
penalty or disciplinary action against the offending solicitor. Rather, a breach of the Rules may 
form the basis of a finding by a relevant body that a legal practitioner has committed an act 
that may lead to a finding of unsatisfactory or unprofessional conduct which may result in 
disciplinary proceedings against the practitioner by their respective law society or institute. 
Role of the Bar 
[1 .1 85] The following extract discusses the role of the Bar in the promotion of and 
compliance with statutory requirements for dispute resolution. It should be noted that 
references to s 1 1 0K of the Supreme Court Act 1 970 (NSW) are now embodied in s 26 of the 
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). References to s 27 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1 984 
(NSW) are now embodied in s 27D of the Commercial Arbitration Act 201 0 (NSW) although 
s 27D has been drafted in such a way that it nullifies some of Emmett's concerns in relation to 
confidentiality. References to r 17 A of the NSW Barristers' Rules are now embodied in r 3 8  of 
the NS W Barristers' Rules adopted on 8 August 201 1 .  The Legal Profession Act 1 987 (NSW) 
has been superseded by the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). Finally, references to the Trade 
Practices Act 1 974 (Cth) are now embodied in Competition and Consumer Act 201 0 (Cth) . 
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The Bar in Mediation and ADR 
[l . 190] S Emmett, "The Bar in Mediation and ADR" (2001 -02) Bar News (Summer) 25 at 25-27. 
Recent Developments in Mediation and ADR Beyond the Bar 
There now exists a myriad of Commonwealth and State enactments dealing with mediation. In several 
instances, this legislation compels mediation or other dispute resolution processes prior to the 
enforcement of rights, for example, Farm Debt Mediation Act 7 994 (NSW), Retail Leases Act 7 994 
(NSW), Native Title Act 7 993 (Cth). In addition, the Federal Court and the Supreme Court have power 
to order parties to mediation without the consent of the parties. The District Court and the Local Court 
have powers of referral only with consent of the parties. Mediation has long since been used in the 
Family Court, Land and Environment Court and Local Court where there are nearly always emotional, 
financial or historical issues beyond the purely legal issues. Similarly, conciliation has long been used in 
industrial tribunals. 
Below are some of the more relevant recent developments in the ADR area. "ADR" has become the 
general term for processes by which disputes are resolved outside the court system. 
The new frontier for ADR is in conflict avoidance and conflict management, rather than just conflict 
resolution. However, it is the conflict or dispute resolution aspect of ADR that has particular relevance for 
the Bar and which intersects with and confronts the Bar's traditional role as that of advocate on ly. 
Section 7 7  OK Supreme Court Act 7 970 (NSW) 
From the NSW Bar's point of view, probably the most relevant recent amendment is s 1 1  OK Supreme 
Court Act 7 970 (NSW), which came into force on 1 August 2000, empowering the Court to order 
parties to mediation or neutral evaluation without their consent. 
There concerns worthy are of consideration about a process that is untransparent, largely unreg ulated 
and seemingly operating without universally accepted, endorsed or enforceable standards of conduct. 
These concerns are particularly valid from a court's point of view in circumstances where it can make 
orders compell ing parties to participate in a process that may not be the parties' process of choice and 
may be a further hurdle to access to the courts. 
On one level, this lack of regulation and transparency is a serious problem with mediation as it 
currently stands - there ought to be concerns about compulsory processes without satisfactory 
supervision. 
On another level, the flexibil ity and confidential ity are the very reasons for the popularity of the 
process where the commercial world is much more concerned with cost effective, pragmatic dispute 
resolution management. 
An origin of these concerns and tensions may lie in s 27 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 7 984 (NSW), 
whereby an arbitrator may, with the consent of the parties, also act as "mediator", although if so 
acting must observe the rules of natural justice and not engage in private conferencing. 
I would suggest it is unfortunate to describe such a process as "mediation" where it prevents such a 
fundamental step i n  a mediation process as private conferencing. It is the absence of any 
determinative or advisory role on the part of a mediator that enables use of such strategies. Once a 
mediator trespasses into either the determinative or advisory role, the risk exists of perceived or actual 
compromising of the very neutral ity that is central to the parties' confidence in the use of mediation. 
Of course, parties may agree to hybrid or varied processes. However, the integrity of the process 
selected is highly dependent on the parties being able to make properly informed choices, perhaps 
necessarily on advice from appropriately trained and skilled advisers. This is not a simple task where 
there exists such a plethora of processes and definitions that are still not yet consistently accepted by 
ADR practitioners themselves. 
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Commercial Contracts 
Many commercial contracts now contain conditions making mediation a pre-requisite to commencing 
litigation. This form of conflict management is prevalent, for example, in the reg ulation of 
infrastructure utilities (such as electricity, telecommunications and rail) in  accordance with Part l l lA of 
the Trade Practices Act 1 974. In disputes concerned with access to monopolistic util ities, the ACCC 
approves regimes for resolution that involve an integrated form of negotiation, mediation, expert 
determination and arbitration, often in the early stages without lawyers. 
These regimes are directed to avoiding potential litigation and the involvement of lawyers and as such 
are readily embraced by the relevant industry users. Generally, the courts will uphold their terms 
provided the clauses are sufficiently certain. (See: Morrow v Chinadotcom [2001 ]  NSWCA 82; but see 
also Elizabeth Bay Development Pty Ltd v Bora/ Building Services (1 995) 36 NSWLR 709; Hooper Bailie 
Associated Limited v Natcon Group Pty Limited (1 992) 28 NSWLR 1 94.) 
There is a move within organisational industries to use "mediation" as, almost, a dispute resolution 
management process that identifies how the issues of the dispute, once distilled; are most effectively 
managed and resolved. For example, it may be that some issues in a dispute are best resolved by 
consensual methods whereas other issues may need either expert determination (binding or non 
binding), arbitration, court determination or a combination of the above. The value of this type of 
mediation as a tool in  the crystall ization of different parts of a dispute and the mechanics for their 
future resolution is now emerging as an effective conflict management process. 
Regulatory Bodies 
Regulatory and semi-regulatory bodies are increasingly using compulsory mediation or binding 
arbitration or both rather than the courts. To mention two prominent examples: the World Intel lectual 
Property Organisation (well known as WI PO) manages disputes arising from the regulation and 
registration of internet domain names by way of binding arbitrations that are often conducted on the 
papers only and thereby are significantly [26] more cost effective; the National Registration Authority 
manages disputes in Australia between chemical owners and potential lessees of the use of the 
chemicals in compounds by way of med iation and or binding arbitrations. Also, s 1 44 of the Legal 
Profession Act 1 987 (NSW) provides for disputes between clients and legal practitioners to be referred 
to mediation, although participation is voluntary . . .  
Barristers' Rule 1 7 A states: 
A barrister must inform the client or the instructing solicitor about the alternatives to 
ful ly-contested adjudication of the case which are reasonably available to the client, unless 
the barrister bel ieves on reasonable grounds that the client already has such an understanding 
of these alternatives as to permit the client to make decisions about the client's best interest 
in relation to the litigation. 
In light of the introduction of Rule 1 7  A in January 2000, barristers need to address the requirements of 
the Rule and their abil ity to comply. 
One can readily envisage a scenario where a disgruntled client who has lost a case becomes aware of 
Rule 1 7A and alleges that the barrister's fai lure to comply resulted in the client being unaware or not 
understanding the alternatives avai lable and that, as a result of this fai lure to inform, the client has lost 
the opportunity to resolve the case on more favourable terms and should therefore be compensated. 
Even without identifiable damage, the barrister may still be vulnerable to a professional conduct 
complaint. 
A number of questions arise for the barristers regarding compliance with this provision: 
1 What are all the alternative processes available to a client to fully-contested adjud ication? 
2 What are the elements of each of these processes? 
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3 What are the possible outcomes for a client in respect of each of these processes? 
4 What is involved in preparation for and what is the time and cost of each of these processes? 
5 What wil l  fully-contested adjudication involve for the client, including outcomes? 
6 How does a barrister assess which of the processes is reasonably available to a given client? 
7 What constitutes reasonable grounds for a belief by a barrister that a client has such an 
understanding of the alternative processes? 
8 What is the meaning of "the clients best interests in relation to the litigation"? 
9 What is the level of understanding required by the client to excuse the barrister from discussing 
alternative processes? 
1 0  Are there any other circumstances which excuse discussion of the alternatives (e.g. urgency of 
interlocutory steps)? 
1 1  Is discussion with the instructing solicitor sufficient to satisfy a barrister of a client's understanding 
of the a lternatives? 
The first question - what sort of alternatives for compliance are available - is one to which the Bar must 
give particular thought given that Rule 1 7  A specifically imposes a requirement on a barrister to inform 
about "alternatives". This may not be as readily answerable as one might think. Even the courts do not 
speak of the same alternatives in their ADR referral sections. For example, the Supreme Court (s 1 1  OK 
Supreme Court Act 1 970) and the District Court (s 1 64A District Court Act 1 973) speak of mediation or 
neutral eva luation, whi lst the Federal Court (s 53A Federal Court of Australia Act 1 976) speaks of 
mediation or arbitration. Below are three of the more relevant of many categorisations, which further 
highlight the difficulties in determining which "alternatives": 
National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) states that processes 
involving third party intervention fall into three broad categories (see NADRAC Definitions 
March 97, and unchanged by NADRAC Report 2001 ): 
• Determinative (adjudication, arbitration, expert determination, references) 
• Advisory (early neutral evaluation, case appraisal, conciliation) 
• Facilitative (mediation, facilitation, conciliation) 
(There is a real debate in the ADR industry as to the overlap, if any, between mediation and 
concil iation and the extent to which any advisory role by the neutral is appropriate in 
mediation. The difficu lty is enhanced by the plethora of definitions both within  Australia and 
international ly. There is currently a subcommittee of the United Nations examining the 
UNCITRAL Rules in respect of this issue.) 
ii In  the Barristers Resolution Service the following alternative processes are identified: 
• Arbitration 
• Expert determination/references 
" Early neutral eva luation or appraisal 
• Mediation 
• Conciliation 
iii The Law Reform Commission purports to map these processes on a continuum from the least 
to the most adjudicative: 
• Negotiation 
• Mediation 
• Neutral eva luation 
48 [l . 1 90] 
,/ntroduction CHAPTER 1 
The Bar in Mediation and ADR cont. 
• Conciliation 
• Expert advice and assessment 
• Arbitration 
However, whatever the appropriate alternatives and definitions, there has been a growing demand for 
an integrated approach to the various processes. 
I would suggest that a barrister's obligation is to turn one's mind to the intention of Rule 1 7  A and its 
pragmatic compliance. The questions raised above simply illustrate the need for careful consideration 
of the duty imposed. (26] 
Barristers in Mediation 
It is important for the Bar to consider the role it will take in these sorts of consensual dispute resolution . 
processes. The important point to stress is that alternative means of dispute resolution are not just a 
vast set of ill-defined processes. ADR has come to be perceived as an industry in itself closely 
interwoven with litigation. 
It is obviously important that compromises reached through mediation be achieved against a 
background of an informed understanding of a party's rights and the remedies available through the 
courts, [27] together with an assessment of the likely outcomes from a court. Solicitors are effectively 
carrying out this role more and more often without recourse to the Bar. 
In a mediation it can be very useful to have the benefit of the skill of an advocate. However, where that 
skill is perceived as the only constructive role for a barrister, then it is often not seen as adding sufficient 
value. The barrister's role should be seen more in terms of advising the client in facilitating a settlement 
with which the client can live rather than a settlement with which the barrister can live. Mediation is 
not there to enforce a party's legal rights, but to manufacture a mutually tolerable resolution. 
Consensual resolution will usually have a greater prospect of acceptance and endurance than 
adjudicated outcomes, because it fosters communication among parties and creative consideration 
beyond rights-based parameters for dealing with conflict. 
There is a perception among solicitors and dispute resolution practitioners that barristers tend to see 
the dispute in terms of court outcomes only and often ignore the wider issues which can lie at the 
heart of a conflict. Failure by legal advisers to address these issues is a common impediment to 
settlement. 
Mediation provides parties with an opportunity to identify and explore these relevant personal factors 
in a confidential forum where voluntary participation is founded in good faith. Whilst the notion of 
"good faith" has difficulties for lawyers in terms of certainty, it is a notion that is well understood and 
embraced by parties participating in a mediation process and is a fundamental cornerstone to the 
success of that process - it is also one of the distinguishing features between mediation and structured 
settlement negotiations. It is a tool to facil itate constructive discussions and is not intended for use as a 
weapon between parties. Similarly confidentiality of discussions is a tool which should facilitate full and 
frank disclosure and discussion of issues thereby offering parties the best opportunity for teasing out 
resolution options for consideration. 
The absence of a desire of a party to participate in that spirit (despite the statutory obl igation to 
participate in good faith imposed by s 1 1  OL of the Supreme Court Act 1 9  70 (NSW)) may be a relevant 
factor for a court to consider before it makes a mandatory order to mediate. 
If barristers are to remain advocates only, rather than dispute resolution advisers (and all that those 
three words import), they need to appreciate the effect that that will have on the Bar's traditional work 
and its perceived ability to participate in mediation, ADR and dispute management. 
Final ly, all this highlights the need for an understanding of these various ADR processes, their proper 
definitions and uses coupled with a universally accepted standard of conduct and accreditation. 
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One of the practical difficulties with a universal standard has been the administrative framework it 
would require and the enforceabil ity of any sanctions or licenses [sic] to be applied. Within professional 
bodies, such as the Bar Association, many of these concerns can be accommodated. 
Similarly, appointment to various panels can go some way to identifying, adopting and enforcing a 
standard of skill, experience and conduct. However, the field of dispute resolution practice is far wider 
than that being conducted by professionals and panels. 
--- S,')Q1 ---
[1 .195] While Emmett's article is a little dated, mainly because of the changes to legislation, it 
still has currency in the debate over the role of the legal profession in dispute resolution. In 
particular, his list of questions for barristers who are required to comply with r 38 of the NSW 
Barristers' Rules is still on point for advocates practicing in our courts today and raises real 
issues about the level of compliance required of the legal profession. 
[1 .200] There have been no cases litigated in Australia where a legal practitioner has been 
sued for failing to advise a client of dispute resolution options. However, there have been a 
number of cases in Australia where legal practitioners have been successfully sued for failing to 
advise clients of certain information or tendering incorrect advice: see NRMA Ltd v Morgan 
(1999) 3 1  ACSR 435; [1 999] NSWSC 407 (although later reversed by the NSW Court of 
Appeal in Heydon v NRMA Ltd [2000] NSWCA 374 ) ; Feletti v Kontoulas [2000] NSWCA 59; 
Vulic v Bilinsky [1 983] 2 NSWLR 472. It is only a matter of time before the issue of a legal 
practitioner failing to advise a client on dispute resolution options comes before a court under 
an action for common law negligence or for professional misconduct or unsatisfactory 
professional conduct pursuant to relevant State and Territory legislation regulating the legal 
profession. 
[1 .205] Questions 
1. What are the historical origins of dispute resolution? 
2. Has dispute resolution flourished in the private or public sector or both? 
3. Should there be an "A" in Alternative Dispute resolution? If so, what should it stand for? 
4. How do you define dispute resolution? 
5. What factors should be considered when choosing a dispute resolution process? 
6. Should the legal profession be as involved in dispute resolution as they currently are? 
7. Does the training of lawyers prevent them from being effective dispute resolution 
practitioners? 
8. Should lawyers properly advise their clients of dispute resolution options? If so, how can 
they properly do so? 
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